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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
This case arises from decisions of the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor 
to Johnny Albert's claims for medical and permanent partial disability benefits 
under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act (Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code 
/ • * »v:»ftt1""" ' > U*UM'> ,;, 
the Commission's Rule 602-2-LD. 
In seeking this Court's review of the Appeals Board's decisions, Barnard & 
B u r k l o i i l n n i d 1 . llii.iill L ' I I I I 0 0 ' Il III!" i". , iiiiiiiliiii.il)it II I l l ,' II l l . t l i A d i m i i i \\M\\\ 
Procedures Act (Title 63, Chapter 46b, Utah Code Annotated: "IJAP A" hereafter). 
Barnard & Burk also contends the Appeals Board misapplied Rule 602-2-1 .D and 
violated other j rincipl t s • : f I Itah lie I 'inalb - Bai nai cl & Eli irl ;: ~ . 
regardless of the Appeals Board's application of Rule 602-2-l.D, the Board's 
decision is inadequate to support an award of medical benefits to Mi Albert... 
The Commission believes the issi les raised by Barnai d & Bi irk are logically 
considered in the following order: 
^
 D o e s R u k 6 ( ) 2 2 ^ p v i o | a t e U A p A ? B a m a r d & B u r k a r g u e s t h a t R u i e 
602- s -1-- •• " nil- i!rn»"r* *«i^  r do'Vn^e^ 
to the pleading requirements set out in §63-46b-6(l) of UAPA. 
~r 
Standard of review: Whether Rule 602-2-l.D violates §63-46b-6(l) of 
UAPA is a question of general law to be reviewed under a "correction of error" 
standard. Pursuant to § 63-46b-16(4)(d) of UAPA, this Court may grant relief if 
the Appeals Board has erroneously interpreted §63-46b-6(l). Harrington v. 
Industrial Commission, 942 P. 2d 961, 963 (Utah App. 1997); Maverik Country 
Stores. Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 860 P.2d 944, 949 (Utah App. 1993). 
Preservation for review: The Commission believes Barnard & Burk did 
not preserve this issue for review. Please refer to the Commission's discussion of 
this issue at Point II, Part A, of this brief. 
2. Did the Appeals Board properly interpret and apply Rule 602-2-
l.D? Barnard & Burk argues that the Appeals Board either a) erroneously 
interpreted Rule 602-2-l.D, or b) applied the rule in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner. 
Standard of review: Pursuant to §63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii) of UAPA, the Court 
will uphold the Board's interpretation of Rule 602-2-l.D unless the interpretation 
exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. Brown & Root v. Industrial 
Commission, 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997). Likewise, pursuant to §63-46b-
16(4)(h)(iv) of UAPA, the Court will apply a "reasonableness and rationality" 
standard in evaluating whether the Board's application of the rule was arbitrary 
and capricious. R.O.A. Gen. Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 966 P.2d 840, 
842 (Utah 1998). 
~T 
Preservation for review: Bamard & Burk raised this issue in proceedings 
before the Appeals Board, thereby preserving the issue for judicial review. (R. 
705-709.) 
3. Is the Appeals Board's application of Rule 602-2-l.D contrary to 
other provisions of Utah law? Bamard & Burk argues that the Appeals Board's 
application of Rule 602-2-l.D is contrary to appellate precedent and other general 
law. 
Standard of review: Whether the Appeals Board properly interpreted and 
applied appellate precedent, rules of civil procedure and nonagency specific 
legislation are questions of general law. Pursuant to §63-46b-16(4)(d) of UAPA, 
the Court will apply a correction of error standard to such questions. Harrington v. 
Industrial Commission, 942 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah App. 1997). 
Preservation for review: Barnard & Burk raised this issue in proceedings 
before the Appeals Board, thereby preserving the issue for judicial review. (R. 
705-709.) 
4. Is the Appeals Board's decision sufficient as to Barnard & Burke's 
liability for Mr. Albert's medical expenses? Bamard & Burk contends the 
Board's findings of fact do not support the Board's conclusion that Bamard & 
Burk is liable for Mr. Albert's medical expenses arising from his accident at 
Bamard & Burk. 
~3~ 
Standard of review: Whether the Board's findings are adequate is a legal 
determination that is made with no deference to the Appeals Board. Adams v. 
Board of Review. 821 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App. 1991). 
Preservation for review: Barnard & Burk raised this issue in proceedings 
before the Appeals Board, thereby preserving the issue for judicial review. (R. 
vol. 3, pp. 540,541) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following determinative statutes and rules are included in Appendix A. 
• Labor Commission Rule 602-2-1 JD, Utah Administrative Code. 
• Section 34A-2-417(l) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
• Section 63-46b-6 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: Barnard & Burk seeks review of the Appeals Board's 
decisions (Appendix B and Appendix C) affirming Administrative Law Judge La 
Jeunesse's determination (Appendix D) that Barnard & Burk must pay medical 
expenses and permanent partial disability compensation for injuries Mr. Albert 
suffered while employed by Barnard & Burk during 1991. 
Course of Proceedings/Statement of Facts:1 Beginning in 1990, while 
Mr. Albert was working for Quality Plating, and then continuing over the next 
1 Barnard & Burk does not challenge the Board's determination of the underlying facts 
regarding Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits. Instead, Barnard & 
Burk appeal focuses on procedural issues. For that reason, this brief combines the course 
of proceedings with such facts as are relevant to the issues in dispute. 
'4 
seven years through subsequent employment with Barnard & Burk, American 
Asbestos, and Ameritemps, Mr. Albert suffered a series of work-related injuries. 
(Appendix D, R. 697.) On October 2, 2001, he filed Applications For Hearing 
with the Commission to compel each of the foregoing employers, including 
Barnard & Burk, to pay medical expenses, temporary total disability compensation 
and permanent partial disability compensation for his injuries. (R. 228-235.) 
After receiving Mr. Albert's Applications For Hearing, the Commission 
sent a Request For Answer to each employer and its workers' compensation 
insurance carrier. The Request For Answer directed each employer/insurance 
carrier to file an Answer to Mr. Albert's Application. The Request For Answer 
specifically advised each employer/insurance carrier that "(f)ailure to set forth 
any affirmative defense(s) may preclude your raising such defense(s) at the 
hearing." (R. 262; emphasis added.) 
Mr. Albert's various claims were consolidated for a single hearing. (R. 
270.) Mr. Albert then filed four amended Applications For Hearing adding a 
claim for permanent total disability compensation against the original respondents. 
(R. 272-279.) Mr. Albert also filed a new Application For Hearing against a fifth 
employer, Trans West Construction. (R. 272.) 
As one of the respondents to Mr. Albert's claims, Barnard & Burk filed its 
Answer on June 28, 2002. (R. 348-364.) Barnard & Burk's Answer included a 
"Seventh Defense" that stated: "Defendants affirmatively allege the applicant's 
claims are or may be barred or limited by the statutes of limitation and/or notice 
~5~ 
provisions contained in Utah Code Annotated §34A-2 et seq., §34A-3 et seq. and 
§35-1 et seq." R.351.) 
Administrative Law Judge La Jeunesse held a formal evidentiary hearing 
on Mr. Albert's claims on December 17, 2002. (R. vol. 9.) Barnard & Burk 
participated through counsel. (R. vol. 9, p. 5.) Even though Barnard & Burk 
participated in opening arguments, Mr. Albert's cross-examination, and closing 
arguments, Barnard & Burk make no reference to any affirmative defenses. (R. 
vol. 9, p. 23-26; 85-94; 134-135; 145-147.) 
Based on the testimonial and documentary evidence submitted at the 
hearing, Judge La Jeunesse made the following findings of fact regarding Mr. 
Albert's claim against Barnard & Burk. 
• Mr. Albert was employed by Barnard & Burk on January 21, 1991. 
(Appendix D; R. 500.) 2) On that day, while removing asbestos at an oil 
refinery on behalf of Barnard & Burk, Mr. Albert slipped, fell, and landed 
on his back on a pipe. He immediately sought medical care (Appendix D; 
R. 506.) 
• Dr. Dall diagnosed Mr. Albert with chronic low back pain, half of which 
was caused by his work accident at Barnard & Burk. Dr. Dall concluded 
that Mr. Albert had suffered a permanent 214% whole person impairment as 
a result of this incident. (Appendix D; R. 507.) 
Based on these facts, Judge La Jeunesse awarded permanent partial 
disability compensation to Mr. Albert for his chronic low back impairment. Judge 
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La Jeunesse also ordered Barnard & Burk to pay "all medical expenses reasonably 
related to Johnny Albert's industrial accident of January 21, 1991." (Appendix D; 
R. 526.) 
On August 21, 2003, Barnard & Burk appealed Judge La Jeunesse's 
decision to the Appeals Board. (R. 540-541.) Barnard & Burk alleged that Mr. 
Albert's right to medical expenses was cut off by operation of § 417(1) of the Act 
because Mr. Albert had not, for a period of three consecutive years, incurred and 
submitted any medical expenses related to his accident at Barnard & Burk. 
Barnard & Burk also alleged that Judge La Jeunesse erred in ordering Barnard & 
Burk to pay medical expenses related to Mr. Albert's accident at Barnard & Burke 
on the grounds there was no evidence that any medical treatment would be 
necessary. With respect to Judge La Jeunesse's award of permanent partial 
disability compensation to Mr. Albert, Barnard & Burk argued the award was 
barred by § 417(2) of the Act because Mr. Albert had not filed his Application For 
Hearing against Barnard & Burk within six years after the date of his accident. 
In his reply to Barnard & Burk's appeal, Mr. Albert argued that Barnard & 
Burk had failed to comply with the Commission's Rule 602-2-l.D and Rule 9(h), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore had waived its affirmative defenses 
under §417(1) and (2). (R. 546-551.) 
In turn, on October 16, 2003, Barnard & Burk replied to Mr. Albert's 
response. Barnard & Burk argued that it had satisfied the requirements of Rule 
9(h) and the Commission's Rule 602-2-l.D in raising its affirmative defenses. 
- r 
However, Barnard & Burk did not allege that the Commission's Rule 602-2-LD 
was contrary to §63-46b-6(l) of UAPA. (R. 691-694) 
The Appeals Board issued its decision in this matter on May 2, 2004. 
Relying on Rule 602-2- LD, the Board concluded that Barnard & Burk had failed 
to properly raise its affirmative defenses under §417 and had therefore waived 
those defenses. The Board also rejected Barnard & Burk's challenge to Judge La 
Jeunesse's determination that Barnard & Burk was liable for Mr. Albert's medical 
expenses related to his injury at Barnard & Burk. (Appendix B; R. 699, 700.) 
Barnard & Burk then asked the Appeals Board to reconsider its decision. 
Barnard & Burk reiterated its previous arguments but then added, for the first 
time, the additional argument that it had no obligation to raise its §417(1) defense 
to Mr. Albert's claim for medical expenses until after Mr. Albert's claim for 
permanent total disability compensation had been denied. (R. 705-709.) 
On October 18, 2004, the Appeals Board denied Barnard & Burk's request 
for reconsideration. (Appendix C; R. 848-850.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Legislature has authorized and directed the Labor Commission to 
promulgate rules governing workers' compensation adjudicative proceedings. The 
Commission has promulgated Rule 602-2-l.D pursuant to that rule-making authority. 
Rule 602-2-l.D simply requires that respondents, such as Barnard & Burk "shall state all 
affirmative defenses with sufficient accuracy and detail that an applicant may be fully 
informed of the nature of the defense asserted 
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In this case, Barnard and Burk filed an Answer to Mr. Albert's claim for benefits 
that purported to raise affirmative defenses to the claim, but did so with no accuracy or 
detail The Appeals Board properly concluded that Barnard & Burk had failed to satisfy 
the requirements of Rule 602-2-l.D and, therefore, had waived its affirmative defenses. 
Regarding Mr. Albert's right to medical treatment for the injuries suffered while 
working at Barnard & Burk, the undisputed facts support the Appeals Board's conclusion 
that he is entitled to such treatment, and Barnard & Burk has suffered no prejudice from 
the Board's determination. 
In addressing the issues presented by Mr. Albert's claim against Barnard & Burk, 
the Appeals Board's decisions have been consistent with applicable law and regulation. 
The Board's decisions are also consistent with the underlying principle that the workers' 
compensation law should be applied liberally in favor of compensation. For these 
reasons, the Appeals Board's decisions should be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: RULE 602-2-13 IS NOT CONTRARY TO UAPA, 
A. Barnard & Burk Did Not Preserve This Issue For Judicial Review, 
Section 63-46b-14(2) of UAPA provides: "A party may seek judicial review only 
after exhausting all administrative remedies available . . . ." The Utah Supreme 
Court "has consistently held that issues not raised in proceedings before 
administrative agencies are not subject to judicial review except in exceptional 
2 Section 63-46b-14(2) sets forth two exceptions to its general rule requiring exhaustion. 
However, neither exception is applicable to the circumstances of this case. 
- r 
circumstances." Brown & Root v. Industrial Commission, 947 P.2d 671, 677 
(Utah 1997). 
The following discussion of the record in this case shows that Barnard & 
Burk never presented its argument that Rule 602-2-l.D is contrary to UAPA to the 
Appeals Board. Consequently, that issue is not subject to judicial review. 
After Judge La Jeunesse ordered Barnard & Burk to pay medical expenses 
and permanent partial disability compensation caused by Mr. Albert's work injury, 
Barnard & Burk appealed to the Appeals Board. (R. 540, 541.) It was in this 
appeal, for the first time, that Barnard & Burk stated that it was relying on §417(1) 
and (2) as affirmative defenses to Mr. Albert's claim. Mr. Albert then responded 
to Barnard & Burk's appeal by arguing that Barnard & Burk had waived its §417 
defenses because it had failed to raise the defenses at the time and in the manner 
required by Rule 602-2-l.D. (R. 548,549.) 
In light of Mr. Albert's response to Barnard & Burk's appeal, the 
applicability of Rule 602-2-l.D to Barnard & Burk's affirmative defenses was 
squarely before the Appeals Board. However, even though Barnard & Burk 
submitted a reply memorandum to Mr. Albert's argument (R. 691-694), Barnard & 
Burk did not suggest that Rule 602-2-1JD violated UAPA. 
The Appeals Board ruled that Barnard & Burk had waived its §417 
defenses by failing to comply with Rule 602-2-l.D. (Appendix B; R. 696-703.) 
Barnard & Burk asked the Board to reconsider its decision (R. 696-701.) But 
even at this point, after the Board had specifically relied on Rule 602-2-l.D to 
~10~ 
reject Barnard & Burk's §417 defenses, Barnard & Burk still did not argue that 
Rule 602-2-l.D violated UAPA. The argument was never raised before the 
Commission or Appeals Board. 
In view of UAPA's requirement that a party seeking judicial review must 
first exhaust all administrative remedies and appellate precedent that issues not 
raised before administrative agencies are not subject to judicial review, the 
Commission submits that this Court should decline to consider Barnard & Burk's 
newly raised assertion that Rule 602-2-l.D is contrary to UAPA. 
B. The Utah Legislature has granted broad authority to the 
Commission to promulgate rules such as 602-2-l.D. 
Section 34A-1-304(1) of the Labor Commission Act (Title 34A, Chapter 1, 
Utah Code Annotated) provides that the Commission "shall make rules governing 
adjudicative procedures" and, except as required by Title 34A and UAPA, such 
rules "are not required to conform to common law or statutory rules of evidence or 
other technical rules of procedure." 
The Commission's rule-making authority is further underscored by §34A-
2-802(1) of the Workers5 Compensation Act: 
The commission, the commissioner, an administrative law 
judge, or the Appeals Board, is not bound by the usual common law 
or statutory rules of evidence, or by any technical or formal rules or 
procedure, other than as provided in this section or as adopted by the 
commission pursuant to this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. The commission may make its 
investigation in such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to 
ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly 
the spirit of the chapter. 
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In light of this legislative grant of rule-making authority, the Commission 
unquestionably had authority to promulgate Rule 602-2-1JD. 
C. Rule 602-2-LD Is Not Contrary To UAPA. Barnard & Burke argue 
that the Commission's Rule 602-2-LD is contrary to §63-46b-6(l) of UAPA. 
However, Barnard & Burk misreads §63-46b-6(l). For example, at page 31 of its 
brief, Barnard & Burk makes the following statement (emphasis added): 
The Legislature has directed by statute [here referring to §63-
46b-6(l)] that a responsive pleading . . . must include only the 
following: 1) the agency's file number . . . , (2) the name of the 
adjudicative proceeding, (3) a statement of the relief that the 
respondent seeks, (4) a statement of the facts, and (5) a statement 
summarizing the reasons that the relief requested should be granted. 
While §63-46b-6(l) identifies elements that must be included in responsive 
pleadings, the statute does not prohibit an administrative agency from requiring 
other elements. Subsection (3) of §63-46b-6 recognizes that "the agency by rule, 
may permit or require pleadings in addition to the . . . response." Likewise, §63-
46b-1(6) provides that UAPA "does not preclude an agency from enacting a rule 
affecting or governing an adjudicative proceeding . . . if the rule conforms to the 
requirements of this Chapter." 
Thus, UAPA itself recognizes the propriety of agency rules, such as Rule 
602-2-LD, that refine and amplify §63-46b-6(l)'s minimum standards for 
responsive pleadings. 
Summary. The Commission submits that Barnard & Burk failed to 
preserve its argument that Rule 602-2-LD violates UAPA. As to the merits of that 
~12 
argument, the Commission acted within clear statutory authority in promulgating 
Rule 602-2- ID. Nothing in UAPA prohibits such rule making; to the contrary, 
UAPA specifically anticipates that agencies will enact such rules. The Court 
should therefore reject Barnard & Burk's argument that Rule 602-2-ID is 
contrary to UAPA. 
POINT II: THE APPEALS BOARD PROPERLY APPLIED 
RULE 602-2-l.D IN THIS CASE. 
Rule 602-2-l.D simply requires respondents in workers' compensation 
proceedings to files answers that "state all affirmative defenses with sufficient 
accuracy and detail that an applicant may be folly informed of the nature of the 
defense asserted." The Appeals Board's application of this rule will be upheld if it 
is within the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. Brown & Root v. 
Industrial Commission, 947 P.2d 677. 
The reasonableness and rationality of the Board's decisions are plain from 
the decisions themselves. (See Appendix B and Appendix C.) The Board 
acknowledged that §417 established affirmative defenses to claims for ongoing 
medical care and for permanent partial disability compensation, but noted that 
affirmative defenses are waived if not properly raised. The Board then referred to 
the plain requirement of Rule R602-2-1D which requires respondents to include 
any affirmative defenses in their answers. 
In considering whether Barnard & Burk had discharged its obligation under 
Rule 602-2-l.D to properly raise its affirmative defenses, the Board contrasted the 
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clarity with which another respondent (Quality) had pled its §417 defenses with 
the vagueness of Barnard & Burk's answer. The Board then explained the purpose 
behind Rule 602-2-l.D: 
It bears repeating that the purpose behind Rule R602-2-1.D is 
to require parties relying on affirmative defenses to provide 
reasonable advance notice of those defenses so that the parties who 
must respond to those defenses have time to investigate the facts and 
present their evidence. Barnard's answer was too vague to meet 
either the spirit or the letter of the rule and, therefore, failed to 
preserve the § 417 defenses that would otherwise have been 
available to Barnard. 
Finally, the Board rejected Barnard & Burk's argument that it had 
preserved its affirmative defenses by presenting evidence relevant to the defenses 
during the course of the evidentiary hearing. 
"When reviewing the Commission's application of its own rules, this court 
will not disturb the agency's interpretation or application of one of the agency's 
rules unless its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality." Brown & Root v. Industrial Commission, Ibid. The Appeals Board's 
decisions meet this test of reasonableness and rationality. 
Barnard & Burk argues that Mr. Albert was reasonably apprised of the 
nature of Barnard & Burk's affirmative defenses by the 'Tacts and circumstances 
surrounding" its Answer. Barnard & Burk also contends that its failure to properly 
raise its affirmative defenses was somehow cured when another respondent, 
Quality, raised the same defenses in its own behalf. However, these arguments 
overlook the principle that affirmative defenses not raised are waived. Pratt v. 
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Board of Education. 564 P.2d 294, 298 (Utah 1977). In order to preserve its 
affirmative defenses, Barnard & Burk was itself required to raise them in the 
manner specified by Rule 602-2-l.D. 
Barnard & Burk also suggests that the Appeals Board's decisions are 
contrary to liberal pleading standards the Labor Commission and Appeals Board 
have applied in other cases. (Petitioner's brief, p. 41) However, a plain 
distinction exists between Barnard & Burk's examples of "liberal pleading 
standards" in other Labor Commission proceedings and the circumstances of this 
proceeding. The examples of liberal pleading standards referenced by Barnard & 
Burk did not involve affirmative defenses or the application of Rule 602-2-l.D. 
The actions taken by the Board in these other proceedings are, therefore, not 
comparable or relevant to the Board's action in this case. 
In conclusion, the Board correctly applied the plain language of Rule 602-
2-l.D to the facts of this case. The Board's decision was reasonable, rational, and 
did not depart from prior agency applications of Rule 602-2-l.D. The Board's 
decision should therefore be upheld. 
POINT III: THE APPEALS BOARD'S APPLICATION OF RULE 
602-2-l.D IS NOT CONTRARY TO OTHER PROVISIONS OF 
UTAH LAW 
Barnard & Burk contends that Appeals Board "erroneously interpreted and 
longstanding, well-established Utah law mandating liberal interpretation of 
administrative pleadings." (Petitioner's brief, p. 22.) The obvious shortcoming of this 
argument is that this proceeding is controlled by Rule 602-2-l.D. As discussed in Part I 
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of this brief, the Commission has promulgated that rule pursuant to clear legislative 
authority and directive. As discussed in Part II of this brief, the Appeals Board has 
properly applied the rule to the facts of this case. Consequently, Barnard & Burk's 
reliance on general statements of law from other forums is of little relevance. 
Apart from its argument that Rule 602-2-1.D is contrary to §63-46b-6(l) of 
UAPA, which argument has been addressed in Point I of this brief, Barnard & Burk has 
not identified any law or precedent with controlling effect that supercedes the application 
of Rule 602-2-1.D. 
POINT IV: THE APPEALS BOARD'S DECISION IS SUFFICIENT 
AS TO BARNARD & BURKE'S LIABILILTY FOR MR. ALBERT'S 
MEDICAL EXPENSES. 
As its final challenge to the Appeals Board's decisions, Barnard & Burk argues 
that the Appeals Board's Order directing Barnard & Burk to "pay all medical expenses 
reasonably related to Johnny Albert's industrial accident of January 21, 1991" is not 
supported by the Order's findings of fact. 
Section 34A-2-401(l) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides that any 
employee injured "by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's 
employment. . . shall be paid . . . medical, nurse and hospital services (and) medicines . . 
. ." Section 34A-2-418(l) of the Act further defines the employer/insurance carrier's 
responsibility to provide medical care for injured workers. "In addition to the 
compensation provided in this chapter . . . the employer or the insurance carrier shall pay 
reasonable sums for medical, nurse, and hospital services, for medicines, and for artifical 
means, appliances and prostheses necessary to treat the injured employee." Subject only 
to defense provided by §417(1), discussed above, this obligation of employers and 
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insurance carriers to pay medical expenses continues indefinitely. United States Fidelity 
& Guaranty v. Industrial Commission, 657 P. 2d 764 (Utah 1983). 
Judge La Jeunesse's findings of fact (Appendix D), adopted by the Appeals Board 
(Appendix B), include findings that while Mr. Albert was employed by Barnard & Burk, 
he was injured in an accident that arose out of and in the course of his employment. 
Judge La Jeunesse also found that Mr. Albert suffered chronic low back pain from his 
injury resulting in a 2Vi% permanent impairment. None of these findings are contested. 
From the foregoing facts, Judge La Jeunesse concluded that Barnard & Burk is 
liable under the Act to pay medical expenses reasonably related to Johnny Albert's 
industrial accident of January 21, 1991. However, Judge La Jeunesse did not order 
Barnard & Burk to pay any current medical expense. The effect of Judge La Jeunesse's 
decision is merely to establish Barnard & Burk's underlying responsibililty for such 
medical expenses. 
Although Barnard & Burk argues that the findings of fact in this matter do nor 
support Judge La Jeunesse's order regarding liability for medical expenses, the foregoing 
discussion demonstrates the contrary. Furthermore, pursuant to §63-46b-16(4) of UAPA, 
"the appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced . . . ." 
Barnard & Burk cannot demonstrate any "substantial prejudice" as a result of the Appeals 
Board's determination of its liability for medical expenses. 
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POINT V: THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS CONSTRUED IN 
FAVOR OF COMPENSATION 
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act must be liberally construed in favor of 
coverage and compensation. In Park Utah Consol. Mines v. Industrial Commission, 84 
Utah 841, 36 P.2d 979, 981 (Utah 1934), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
If there is any doubt "respecting the right to compensation, such doubt 
should be resolved in favor of the employee or of his dependents as the 
case may be." (Citing Chandler v. Industrial Commission, supra.) 
Likewise, in Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah 1990), the 
Court stated: 
It is the duty of the courts and the commission to construe the Workers' 
Compensation Act liberally and in favor of employee coverage when 
statutory terms reasonably admit of such a construction. 
More recently, both the Utah Supreme Court and this Court have reaffirmed the 
continued vitality of the principle of liberal construction: See Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre 
Inv. Co, 956 P.2d at 260 (Utah 1998); see also Burgess v. Siaperas Sand & Gravel 965 
P.2d 583, 588 (Utah App. 1998). 
The Commission recognizes that this principle of liberal construction does not 
mean that compensation should be allowed in every claim. Walls v. Industrial 
Commission, 857 P.2d 964, (Utah App. 1993). However, in cases such as this, where 
there is no dispute than an employee has suffered work-related injuries and the Appeals 
Board has reasonably determined that the employer has waived its affirmative defenses to 
the employee's claim for benefits; the principle of liberal construction supports the 
Appeals Board's award of benefits. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, the Utah Labor Commission respectfully requests 
that Barnard & Burk's Petition For Review be denied and that the decisions of the 
Appeals Board be affirmed. 
Dated this CMU day of April, 2005. 
AW-Vk-la 
Alan Hennebold 
General Counsel 
Utah Labor Commission 
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Appendix A 
R602 . Labor Commission, Adjudication. 
R602-2. Adjudication of Workers1 Compensation and Occupational 
Disease Claims. 
R602-2-1. Pleadings and Discovery. 
A. For the purposes of this rule, "Commission" means the 
Labor Commission. "Division" means the Division of Adjudication 
within the Labor Commission. Adjudicative proceedings for 
workers1 compensation and occupational disease claims may be 
commenced by the injured worker or dependent filing a request for 
agency action with the Commission. The Administrative Law Judge 
is afforded discretion in allowing intervention of other parties 
pursuant to Section 63-46b-9. The Application for Hearing is the 
request for agency action. All such applications shall include 
supporting medical documentation of the claim where there is a 
dispute over medical issues. Applications without supporting 
documentation will not be mailed to the employer or insurance 
carrier for answer until the appropriate documents have been 
provided. 
B. Whenever a claim for compensation benefits is denied by 
an employer or insurance carrier, the burden rests on the 
applicant to initiate the action by filing an Application for 
Hearing with the Commission. 
C. When an Application for Hearing is filed with the 
Commission, the Commission shall forthwith mail a copy to the 
employer or to the employer's insurance carrier. 
D. The employer or insurance carrier shall have 30 days 
following the date of the mailing of the application to file a 
written answer with the Commission, admitting or denying liability 
for the claim. The answer shall state all affirmative defenses 
with sufficient accuracy and detail that an applicant may be fully 
informed of the nature of the defense asserted. All answers shall 
include a summary and categorization of benefits paid to date on 
the claim. A copy shall be sent to the applicant or, if there is 
one, to the applicant's attorney by the defendant. 
E. When an employer or insurance carrier fails to file an 
answer within the 30 days provided above, the Commission may enter 
a default against such employer or insurance carrier. The 
Commission may then set the matter for hearing, take evidence 
bearing on the claim, and enter an Order based on the evidence 
presented. Such defaults may be set aside by following the 
procedure outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Said 
default shall apply to the defendant employer or insurance carrier 
and may not be construed to deprive the Employersf Reinsurance 
Fund or the Uninsured Employers1 Fund of any appropriate defenses. 
F. When the answer denies liability solely on the medical 
aspects of the case, the applicant, through his/her attorney or 
agent, and the employer or insurance carrier, with the approval of 
the Commission or its representative, may enter into a stipulated 
set of facts, which stipulation, together with the medical 
documents bearing on the case in the Commission's file, may be 
used in making the final determination of liability. 
G. When deemed appropriate, the Commission or its 
representatives may have a pre-hearing or post-hearing conference. 
H. Upon filing of the Answer, the defendant may commence 
discovery with appropriate sets of interrogatories. Such 
discovery should focus on the accident event, witnesses, as well 
as past and present medical care. The defendant shall also be 
entitled to appropriately signed medical releases to allow 
gathering of pertinent medical records. The defendant may also 
require the applicant to submit to a medical examination by a 
physician of the defendant's choice. Failure of an applicant to 
comply with such requests may result in the dismissal of a claim 
or a delay in the scheduling of a hearing. 
I. Commission subpoena forms shall be used in all discovery 
proceedings and shall be signed, unless good cause is shown for a 
shorter period, at least one week prior to any scheduled hearing. 
J. All medical records shall be filed by the employer or its 
insurance carrier as a single joint exhibit at least one week 
before the scheduled hearing. Claimant must cooperate and submit 
all pertinent medical records contained in his/her file to the 
employer or its insurance carrier for the joint exhibit submission 
two weeks in advance of a scheduled hearing. Exhibits are to be 
placed in an indexed binder arranged by care provider in 
chronological order. Exhibits shall include all relevant treatment 
records which tend to prove or disprove a fact in issue. Pages 
shall be numbered consecutively. Hospital nurses1 notes, 
duplicate materials, and other non-relevant materials may not be 
included. 
K. The Administrative Law Judge shall be notified one week 
in advance of any proceeding when it is anticipated that more than 
four witnesses will be called, or where it is anticipated that the 
hearing of the evidence will require more than two hours. 
L. Decisions of the presiding officer in any adjudicative 
proceeding shall be issued in accordance with the provisions of 
Section 63-46b-5 or 63-46b-10. 
M. Any party to an adjudicative proceeding may obtain review 
of an Order issued by an Administrative Law Judge by filing a 
written request for review with the Adjudication Division in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 63-4 6b-12 and Section 
34A-1-303. Unless a request for review is properly filed, the 
Administrative Law Judge's Order is the final order of the 
Commission. If a request for review is filed, other parties to 
the adjudicative proceeding may file a response within 20 calendar 
days of the date the request for review was filed. Thereafter, 
the Administrative Law Judge shall: 
1. Reopen the case and enter a Supplemental Order after 
holding such further hearing and receiving such further evidence 
as may be deemed necessary, 
2. Amend or modify the prior Order by a Supplemental order, 
or 
3. Refer the entire case for review under Section 34A-2-801. 
If the Administrative Law Judge enters a Supplemental Order, 
as provided in this subsection, it shall be final unless a request 
for review of the same is filed. 
N. In formal adjudicative proceedings, the Division shall 
generally follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding 
discovery and the issuance of subpoenas, except as the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure are modified by the express provisions of 
Section 34A-2-802, or as may be otherwise modified by the 
presiding officer. 
0. A request for reconsideration of an Order on Motion for 
Review may be allowed and shall be governed by the provisions of 
Section 63-46b-13. Any petition for judicial review of final 
agency action shall be governed by the provisions of Section 63-
46b-14. 
KEY: workers' compensation, administrative procedure, hearings, 
settlement 
January 15, 2002 
Notice of Continuation September 5, 2002 
34A-1-301 et seq. 
63-46b-l et seq. 
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(12) <a) Subject to appellate review under Section 34A-1-303, the commis-
sion has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine whether the treat-
ment or services rendered to an employee by a physician are: 
(i) reasonably related to industrial injuries or occupational dis-
eases; and 
(ii) compensable pursuant to this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. 
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (12)(a), Subsection 34A-2-21K7), 
or Section 34A-2-212, a person may not maintain a cause of action in any 
forum within this state other than the commission for collection or 
payment of a physician's billing for treatment or services that are 
compensable under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease 
Act. 
History: C. 1953, 35-1-97, enacted by L. 
1990, ch. 69, § 5; 1994, ch. 224, § 11; 1995, 
ch. 308, § 1; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 
240, § 150; 1997, ch, 205, § 1; renumbered 
by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 115; 2003, ch. 67, § 1; 
2004, ch. 113, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2003 amend-
ment, effective May 5, 2003, added the defini-
tion of ^physician" (Subsection (1)); added Sub-
section (3)(b)(ii); in Subsection (5)(d), 
substituted the reference to a report "in accor-
dance with Subsection (9)" for "the Physician's 
Initial Report of Work Injury or Occupational 
Disease"; rewrote Subsection (8); substituted 
"physician" for "physician, surgeon, or other 
health provider" in several places; and made 
designation changes and other stylistic changes 
throughout the section. 
The 2004 amendment, effective May 3, 2004, 
added Subsections (2)(c) and (9)(a)(ii) and made 
stylistic changes. 
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — When limitations period begins to 
run as to claim for disability benefits for con-
tracting of disease under workers' compensa-
tion or occupational diseases act, 86 A.L.R.5th 
295. 
34A-2-413. Permanent total disability — Amount of pay-
ments — Rehabilitation* 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Final order 
Review of plan. 
Final order. 
Because an order to initiate temporary sub-
sistence payments was based on the initial 
finding, it was not a "final order" from which an 
abstract could have been issued. While §§ 34A-
1^303 and 34A-2-801 set forth a broad defini-
tion of what constitutes a final order, § 34A-2-
413 excepts an initial finding of permanent 
total disability from the broad definition of 
"final order" by expressly stating that the ini-
tial, tentative finding is not final. Thomas v. 
Color Country Mgmt., 2004 UT 12, 492 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 9, 84 P.3d 1201. 
Review of plan. 
In requiring a "review" of an employer^ re-
employment plan (see Subsection (6)(a)(iii)), 
the Legislature intended an independent eval-
uation and approval of the plan. Color Country 
Mgmt. v. Labor Comm'n, 2001 UT App 370, 38 
P3d 969, cert, denied, 42 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002) 
34A-2-417. Claims and benefits — Time limits for filing — 
Burden of proof. 
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonpermanent total disabil-
ity cases an employee's medical benefit entitlement ceases if for a period of 
three consecutive years the employee does not: 
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(a) incur medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial acci-
dent; and 
(b) submit the medical expenses incurred to the employee's employer or 
insurance carrier for payment. 
(2) (a) A claim described in Subsection (2)(b) is barred, unless the employee: 
(i) files an application for hearing with the Division of Adjudication 
no later than six years from the date of the accident; and 
(ii) by no later than 12 years from the date of the accident, is able 
to meet the employee's burden of proving tha t the employee is due the 
compensation claimed under this chapter. 
(b) Subsection (2)(a) applies to a claim for compensation for: 
(i) temporary total disability benefits; 
(ii) temporary partial disability benefits; 
(iii) permanent partial disability benefits; or 
(iv) permanent total disability benefits. 
(c) The commission may enter an order awarding or denying an 
employee's claim for compensation under this chapter within a reasonable 
time period beyond 12 years from the date of the accident, if: 
(i) the employee complies with Subsection (2)(a); and 
(ii) 12 years from the date of the accident: 
(A) (I) the employee is fully cooperating in a commission 
approved reemployment plan; and 
(II) the results of tha t commission approved reemploy-
ment plan are not known; or 
(B) the employee is actively adjudicating issues of compensa-
bility before the commission. 
(3) A claim for death benefits is barred unless an application for hearing is 
filed within one year of the date of death of the employee. 
(4) (a) (i) Subject to Subsections (2)(c) and (4)(b), after an employee files an 
application for hearing within six years from the date of the accident, 
the Division of Adjudication may enter an order to show cause why the 
employee's claim should not be dismissed because the employee has 
failed to meet the employee's burden of proof to establish an entitle-
ment to compensation claimed in the application for hearing. 
(ii) The order described in Subsection (4)(a)(i) may be entered on 
the motion of the: 
(A) Division of Adjudication; 
(B) employee's employer; or 
(C) employer's insurance carrier. 
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a), the Division of Adjudication may dismiss a 
claim: 
(i) without prejudice; or 
(ii) with prejudice only if: 
(A) the Division of Adjudication adjudicates the merits of the 
employee's entitlement to the compensation claimed in the appli-
cation for hearing; or 
(B) the employee fails to comply with Subsection (2)(a)(ii). 
(c) If a claim is dismissed without prejudice under Subsection (4)(b), the 
employee is subject to the time limits under Subsection (2)(a) to claim 
compensation under this chapter. 
(5) A claim for compensation under this chapter is subject to a claim or hen 
for recovery under Section 26-19-5. 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 63-46b-7 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-5, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 261; 1988, ch. 72, § 17. 
Procedural errors. 
Cited. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Driver License Services hearing. Brinkerhoff v. 
Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
Cited in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance 
. Board of State 
errors occurring at an informal Division of 2 3 3 (Utah 1992). 
Procedural errors 
Trial de novo cured any technical procedural v ' *^*®£* L a n d s & Forest^ 8 3 0 R 2 d 
63-46b-6. Procedures for formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings — Responsive pleadings. 
(1) In all formal adjudicative proceedings, unless modified by rule according 
to Subsection 63-46b-3(5), the respondent, if any, shall file and serve a written 
response signed by the respondent or the respondent's representative within 
30 days of the mailing date or last date of publication of the notice of agency 
action or the notice under Subsection 63-46b-3(3)(d), which shall include: 
(a) the agency's file number or other reference number; 
(b) the name of the adjudicative proceeding; 
(c) a statement of the relief that the respondent seeks; 
(d) a statement of the facts; and 
(e) a statement summarizing the reasons that the relief requested 
should be granted. 
(2) The respondent shall send a copy of the response filed under Subsection 
(1) to each party 
(3) The presiding officer, or the agency by rule, may permit or require 
pleadings in addition to the notice of agency action, the request for agency 
action, and the response. All documents permitted or required to be filed shall 
be filed with the agency and one copy shall be sent to each party 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-6, enacted by L. "The response shall be filed with the agency 
1987, ch. 161, § 262; 1988, ch. 72, § 18; 2001, and one copy shall be sent by mail to each 
ch. 138, § 14. party," in Subsection (3) substituted 
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 "documents'* for "papers* and deleted "by mail" 
amendment, effective April 30,2001, inSubsec- before "to each party," and made a stylistic 
tion (2) substituted the present provisions for change. 
63-46b-7. Procedures for formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings — Discovery and subpoenas. 
(1) In formal adjudicative proceedings, the agency may, by rule, prescribe 
means of discovery adequate to permit the parties to obtain all relevant 
information necessary to support their claims or defenses. If the agency does 
not enact rules under this section, the parties may conduct discovery according 
to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(2) Subpoenas and other orders to secure the attendance of witnesses or the 
production of evidence in formal adjudicative proceedings shall be issued by 
the presiding officer when requested by any party, or may be issued by the 
presiding officer on his own motion. 
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APPEALS BOARD 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
JOHNNY ALBERT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT 
and WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND; 
QUALITY PLATTING CO and 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND; 
BARNARD & BURK GROUP, INC. and 
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS.; | 
AMERITEMPS, INC. and HARTFORD 
INS.; TRANSWEST CONSTRUCTION; 
UNINSURANCED EMPLOYERS' FUND 
and EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND, 
Respondents. 
ORDER DENYING REQUEST 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Case Nos. 97-0576,99-1213, 
99-1214,01-1070,01-1071, 
01-1072,01-1073, & 02-0595 
Barnard & Burk and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, National Union Fire 
Insurance (referred to jointly as "Barnard" hereafter), ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor 
Commission to reconsider its prior determination awarding benefits to Johnny Albert under the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-
46b-13. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
Judge La Jeunesse ordered Barnard to pay permanent partial disability compensation and 
medical expenses arising from a back injury Mr. Albert suffered at Barnard on January 21, 1991. 
Barnard then sought Appeals Board review of Judge La Jeunesse's decision on the grounds that Mr. 
Albert's claim for medical expenses is barred by §417(1) of the Act and his claim for permanent 
partial disability compensation is barred by § 417(2) of the Act. In response, Mr. Albert argued that, 
because Barnard failed to raise its §417 defenses in its answer to Mr. Albert's claim, Barnard waived 
those defenses. 
In its decision issued May 3,2004, the Appeals Board concluded that Barnard had waived its 
§417 defenses. The Appeals Board therefore affirmed Judge La Jeunesse's award of benefits to Mr. 
Albert. Barnard now asks the Appeals Board to reconsider its decision. Barnard argues that it: 1) 
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was under no obligation to raise its §417(1) defense in its answer to Mr. Albert's claim; and 2) did, 
in fact, adequately raise its §417 defenses. 
DISCUSSION 
Barnard's obligation to raise its §417(1) defense. Section § 417(1) of the Act contains the 
following restriction to an injured worker's right to receive medical treatment for work-related 
injuries (emphasis added): 
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonpermanent total disability 
cases an employees medical benefit entitlement ceases if for a period of three 
consecutive years the employee does not: 
(a) incur medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial accident; and 
(b) submit the medical expenses incurred to the employee's employer or insurance 
carrier for payment. 
Barnard argues that it was not required to raise the foregoing statute's three year "incur and 
submit" requirement as a defense in its answer to Mr. Albert's claim because the defense only 
applies to "nonpermanent total disability cases," and at the time Barnard filed its answer, Mr. 
Albert's claim was for permanent total disability. 
As a preliminary matter, the Appeals Board notes that Barnard failed to raise this issue in its 
original motion for review. Section 63-46b-12(l)(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
requires a party seeking agency review to "state the grounds for review." This requirement is 
necessary to avoid piecemeal review proceedings. Because Barnard failed to raise this issue as a 
grounds for review in its initial motion for review, the Appeals Board declines to consider the issue 
for the first time as part of this reconsideration proceeding. 
But even if the Appeals Board were to consider the merits of Barnard's new argument, the 
Appeals Board would reject that argument. Mr. Albert's application for hearing made a claim for 
both permanent total disability compensation and medical benefits. The claim for medical benefits 
was not dependent upon the claim for permanent total disability compensation. It was therefore 
Barnard's obligation to raise in its answer all its defenses to the medical claim, including its §417(1) 
defense. 
Sufficiency of Barnard's §417 defenses. Having concluded that Barnard was required to raise 
its §417 defenses in its answer to Mr. Albert's claim, the Appeals Board must consider whether 
Barnard did so. Barnard's answer contained only vague and tentative references to statutes of 
limitation and notice provisions that might be found somewhere in the Workers' Compensation Act 
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or Occupational Disease Act. Barnard's answer did not "state all affirmative defenses with sufficient 
accuracy and detail that an applicant may be fully informed of the nature of the defense asserted," as 
required by the Commission's Rule 602-2-1 .D. 
Barnard aigues thaX «ven \i i\s axfswti ^ a s YIO\ s\tf&ifcn\\mde* \he Coixmisswrf s Rxife 6Q2-2-
1 .D to preserve its §417 defenses, its answer was sufficient under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and appellate precedent interpreting those rules. However, it is the Commission's rules that govern 
adjudicative process before the Commission. Consequently, the Appeals Board looks to the 
Commission's Rule R602-2-1.D, rather than the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to evaluate the 
sufficiency of Barnard's answer. 
For the reasons already discussed in this decision and in the Appeals Board's previous 
decision, the Appeals Board concludes that Barnard's answer did not raise its §417 defenses and that 
those defenses were, therefore, waived. 
ORDER 
The Commission reaffirms its previous decision and denies Barnard's request for 
reconsideration. It is so ordered. 
Dated this / t f^day of October, 2004. 
-SZ>ST&^ 
Colleen Colton, Chair 
Patricia S. Drawe 
>se^ )h E. Hatch Jo! 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition For Review 
with that Court within 30 days of the date of this Order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Reconsideration in the matter 
of Johnny Albert, Case Nos. 97-0576,99-1213,99-1214,01-1070,01-1071,01-1072,01-1073 & 02-
0959, was mailed, first class, postage prepaid this /tf^clay of October, 2004, to the following: 
JOHNNY ALBERT 
2550 WEST 2780 SOUTH #171 
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84119 
AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT 
1575 WEST 2550 SOUTH 
OGDENUT 84401 
ELLIOT MORRIS, ATTORNEY 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
392 EAST 6400 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107 
FLOYD HOLM, ATTORNEY 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
392 EAST 6400 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107 
QUALITY PLATING 
2087 WEST 2425 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84097 
BARNARD & BURK GROUP INC 
P O BOX 117 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110 
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS. 
AIGCA 
101 CONVENTION CENTER #1100 
LAS VEGAS NV 89109 
AMERITEMPS INC. 
716 EAST 4500 SOUTH 
MURRAY UT 84107 
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HARTFORD INS. 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
JOHNNY ALBERT, 
Applicant, 
AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT * 
and WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND; * 
QUALITY PLATING and WORKERS * 
COMPENSATION FUND; BARNARD & * 
BURK GROUP, INC. and NATIONAL * 
UNION FIRE INS.; AMERITEMPS, INC. * 
and HARTFORD INS.; TRANSWEST * 
CONSTRUCTION; UNINSURED * 
EMPLOYERS' FUND; EMPLOYERS' * 
REINSURANCE FUND, * 
Defendants. * 
Quality Plating, Barnard & Burk, and Ameritemps, by and through their respective insurance 
carriers, ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge 
La Jeunesse's decision regarding Johnny Albert's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED 
Over the course of many years, while working for several different employers, Mr. Albert 
suffered a series of injuries to his low back, right foot and left foot. In addition to these work 
injuries, Mr. Albert is intellectually and emotionally challenged. He now seeks disability and 
medical benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
The parties agree that Mr. Albert's physical, intellectual and emotional problems have left 
him permanently and totally disabled. They disagree over the specific benefits Mr. Albert is entitled 
to receive, and their respective liabilities for those benefits. To resolve these questions, Judge La 
Jeunesse held an evidentiary hearing on December 17,2002. On July 22,2003, Judge La Jeunesse 
issued his decision, which can be summarized as follows: 
ORDER ON 
MOTIONS FOR REVIEW 
Case Nos. 97-0576, 
99-1213,99-1214 
01-1070,01-1071, 
01-1072,01-1073, 
and 02-0595 
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• Transwest, the Uninsured Employers' Fund, and the Employers' Reinsurance Fund were 
relieved of any liability for Mr. Albert's claims. 
• Quality Plating and its insurance carrier, Workers Compensation Fund (referred to j ointly 
as "Quality"), were ordered to pay temporary total disability compensation, permanent partial 
disability compensation and medical expenses for low back injuries Mr. Albert suffered while 
working for Quality on June 18, 1990. 
• Barnard & Burk and its insurance carrier, National Union Fire Insurance ("Barnard"), 
were ordered to pay permanent partial disability compensation and medical expenses for a 
second low back injury that Mr. Albert suffered while working for Barnard on January 21, 
1991. 
• American Asbestos Abatement and its insurance carrier, Workers Compensation Fund 
("American"), were ordered to pay medical expenses for a third low back injury Mr. Albert 
suffered while working for American on July 28, 1991. 
• Ameritemps and its insurance carrier, Hartford Insurance ("Ameritemps"), were ordered 
to pay permanent total disability compensation beginning June 16, 1997, and medical 
expenses for a left foot injury Mr. Albert suffered while working for American on June 16, 
1997. 
Quality, Barnard and Ameritemps now request review of Judge La Jeunesse's decision. 
Quality contests its liability for medical expenses. Barnard contests its liability for medical expenses 
and permanent partial disability compensation. Ameritemps contends it is not liable for Mr. Albert's 
permanent total disability compensation. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission affirms and adopts Judge La Jeunesse's findings of fact. Those facts are 
summarized below and are also supplemented by the Appeals Board's additional findings relative to 
the specific issues raised in the parties' motions for review. 
Working for Quality on June 18, 1990, Mr. Albert injured his low back while lifting some 
metal plates. He received medical attention and was off work for one week. He incurred a 2 lA % 
whole person impairment as a result of this back injury. Thereafter, Mr. Albert submitted no other 
medical expenses to Quality for payment. However, in his application for hearing against Quality, 
filed on October 3,2001, Mr. Albert claimed additional medical expenses. Quality's answer to Mr. 
Albert's application reported that "(t)he last benefits provided in this matter were paid on July 6, 
1990. Workers' Compensation Fund has received no other medical bills . . . ." Quality's answer 
then denied liability for further medical expense on the grounds such liability was barred "by the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. Section 34A-2-417." 
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While working for Barnard on January 21, 1991, Mr. Albert slipped, fell on a pipe and 
injured his low back. He received medical attention at the time, but did not miss any work. This 
injury resulted in an additional 2 lA % permanent whole person impairment. In his application for 
hearing against Barnard filed on October 3, 2001, Mr. Albert claimed additional medical and 
disability benefits for the January 1991 injury. Barnard's answer included as its "Seventh Defense" a 
statement that "Defendants affirmatively allege the applicant's claims are or may be barred or limited 
by the statutes of limitation and/or notice provisions contained in Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2 et 
seq., § 34A-3 et seq. and § 35-1 et seq." 
On July 28, 1991, Mr. Albert injured his right foot while working at American Asbestos. 
This injury caused a 9% permanent whole person impairment. After a lengthy period of recovery, 
Mr. Albert was able to return to work, this time with Ameritemps. 
Nine months after beginning employment with Ameritemps, Mr. Albert crushed his left great 
toe in a work-related accident. This injury required four surgeries, over a period of 13 months. Mr. 
Albert did not reach medical stability until February 25, 1999, and then was left with a 4% 
permanent whole person impairment. Mr. Albert has been unable to work since the accident at 
Ameritemps on June 16, 1997. 
In addition to Mr. Albert's work-place injuries and resulting impairments, he has a low IQ 
and severe deficits in memory, concentration, judgment and other mental functions. He also suffers 
from significant depression that constitutes a 30% whole-person impairment, 1/3 of which is 
attributable to the injuries and chronic pain from his work accidents.. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
As already noted, Quality, Barnard and Ameritemps request review of Judge La Jeunesse's 
decision. Their respective arguments are addressed separately below. 
Quality's liability for medical expenses. The only part of Judge La Jeunesse's Order 
challenged by Quality is the directive that Quality pay ongoing medical expenses necessary to treat 
Mr. Albert's back injuries from his accident at Quality on June 18, 1990. In arguing that it has no 
further liability for these medical expense, Quality relies on the affirmative defense established by § 
417(1) of the Act: 
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonpermanent total disability 
cases an employee's medical benefit entitlement ceases if for a period of three 
consecutive years the employee does not: 
(a) incur medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial accident; and 
(b) submit the medical expenses incurred to the employee's employer or insurance 
carrier for payment. 
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Quality contends that, because Mr. Albert did not submit any medical expenses for payment 
after 1990, the "three year" provision of § 417(1) ends his right to future payments of medical 
expenses. In response, Mr. Albert argues that Quality cannot assert § 417(1) as an affirmative 
defense because Quality failed to adequately raise that defense in its answer to Mr, Albert's 
application. 
Commission Rule R602-2-1.D addresses the content requirements that apply to answers in 
workers' compensation proceedings: 
The employer or insurance carrier shall have 30 days following the date of the 
mailing of the application to file a written answer with the Commission, admitting or 
denying liability for the claim. The answer shall state all affirmative defenses with 
sufficient accuracy and detail that an applicant may be fully informed of the nature of 
the defense asserted.... (emphasis added) 
The objective of Rule R602-2-1.D is to give applicants reasonable advance notice of 
affirmative defenses so that they can investigate the facts and prepare a response. Quality asserted 
§417( 1) as an affirmative defense not only by citing § 417 itself, but also by stating the factual basis 
that supported the defense. The Appeals Board finds that Quality's answer contained "sufficient 
accuracy and detail" to allow Mr. Albert to be "fully informed of the nature of the defense asserted," 
and thereby satisfied Rule R602-2-l.D's requirements 
Having concluded that Quality properly raised its §417(1) defense, the Appeals Board turns 
to the merits of that defense. There is no evidence that Mr. Albert submitted any medical expenses 
to Quality after 1990. Therefore, by operation of § 417(1), Quality's obligation to pay for medical 
treatment related to Mr. Albert's accident of June 18, 1990, has now ended. Judge La Jeunesse's 
order will be modified accordingly. 
Barnard's liability for medical and disability benefits. Judge La Jeunesse ordered Barnard to 
pay permanent partial disability compensation and medical expenses arising from the back injury Mr. 
Albert suffered at Barnard on January 21,1991. Barnard challenges Judge La Jeunesse's Order on 
the grounds that Mr. Albert's claim for medical expenses is barred by §417(1), and his claim for 
permanent partial disability compensation is barred by § 417(2). Mr. Albert responds by arguing 
that, because Barnard failed to adequately raise its §417 defenses in its answer, those defenses are 
waived. 
As already discussed in the preceding section of this decision, § 417(1) establishes an 
affirmative defense to ongoing liability for medical care if the injured worker does not, for a period 
of three years, 1) incur medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial accident and 2) submit 
the medical expenses incurred to the employee's employer or insurance carrier for payment. 
Similarly, § 417(2) provides an affirmative defense to claims for permanent partial disability 
compensation if no application for such compensation has been filed within six years from the date 
of the accident. But affirmative defenses are waived if not properly raised, and the Commission's 
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Rule R602-2-1.D requires the employer or insurance carrier to state in their answers ". . . all 
affirmative defenses with sufficient accuracy and detail that an applicant may be fully informed of 
the nature of the defense asserted...." 
In the previous part of this decision, the Appeals Board concluded that Quality had raised its 
§417(1) defense with sufficient accuracy and detail to satisfy Rule R602-2-1.D, in that Quality 
specifically cited the statute and also set out the factual basis for application of the statute. In 
contrast to Quality's specificity, Barnard's answer does not reference § 417, but instead refers in very 
broad terms to old and current versions of the entire Workers' Compensation Act and the entire 
Occupational Disease Act. Furthermore, Barnard's answer states no factual basis to support its § 417 
defenses. 
It bears repeating that the purpose behind Rule R602-2-1.D is to require parties relying on 
affirmative defenses to provide reasonable advance notice of those defenses so that the parties who 
must respond to those defenses have time to investigate the facts and present their evidence. 
Barnard's answer was too vague to meet either the spirit or the letter of the rule and, therefore, failed 
to preserve the § 417 defenses that would otherwise have been available to Barnard. 
Barnard contends that, even if its answer was inadequate to raise its §417 defenses, it 
nevertheless proffered evidence during the evidentiary hearing that was sufficient to raise those 
defenses. The Appeals Board disagrees. Rule R602-2-1.D requires that affirmative defenses be 
raised in a party's answer, rather than at hearing. But assuming for discussion that the defenses can 
be presented for the first time at the evidentiary hearing, nothing in the proffer that Barnard made 
during the evidentiary hearing in this case can reasonably be viewed as raising Barnard's § 417 
defenses. 
Having concluded that Barnard waived its §417 defenses, the Appeals Board turns to 
Barnard's contention that a medical panel must be appointed to evaluate Mr. Albert's need for future 
medical treatment for the back injury in question. Barnard has not established any of the 
circumstances identified by Commission Rule R602-2-2 as justifying appointment of a medical 
panel. For that reason, the Appeals Board declines to require appointment of a medical panel. 
Ameritemps' liability for permanent total disability compensation. Ameritemps contends it 
is not liable for Mr. Albert's permanent total disability compensation because the injury Mr. Albert 
suffered while working for Ameritemps is not the cause of his inability to work. Mr. Albert's right 
to permanent total disability compensation is governed by § 34A-2-413(b) of the Act, as follows: 
To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the 
employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence that: 
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of 
impairments as a result of the industrial accident... that gives rise to the permanent 
total disability entitlement; 
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and 
00700 
JOHNNY ALBERT 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR REVIEW 
Page 6 
(iii) the industrial accident . . . was the direct cause of the employee's 
permanent total disability. 
Ameritemps concedes Mr. Albert satisfies § 413(b)(ii)'s requirement that he is "permanently 
and totally disabled." Consequently, the Appeals Board turns to the two remaining requirements of § 
413(b): subsection (i)'s requirement of a significant impairment resulting from the accident at 
Ameritemps that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement; and subsection (iii)'s 
requirement that the accident was the direct cause of Mr. Albert's permanent total disability. 
The Appeals Board agrees with and adopts Judge La Jeunesse' s reasoning on the two points 
in question. Mr. Albert's accident at Ameritemps on June 16,1997, left him with a significant 4% 
whole person impairment and also contributed to his already-existing depression. Although Mr. 
Albert had other work-related impairments, mental limitations and emotional difficulties before his 
accident at Ameritemps, he still had been able to work. After the numerous surgeries, additional 
impairment, and extended time away from the labor force that resulted from the Ameritemps 
accident, he was no longer able to work. The Appeals Board therefore agrees with Judge La 
Jeunesse that Mr. Albert has established 1) a significant impairment resulting from the Ameritemps 
accident and 2) that the Ameritemps accident was the direct cause of his permanent total disability. 
ORDER 
The Appeals Board grants Quality's motion for review and hereby relieves Quality of liability 
for Mr. Albert's medical expenses by striking paragraph six of Judge La Jeunesse's "order," found 
at page 31 of Judge La Jeunesse's "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order." 
The Appeals Board affirms all other parts of Judge La Jeunesse's decision and denies the 
Motions for Review of Barnard and Ameritemps. 
It is so ordered. 
Dated this <$_ day of 
IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE. 
; 2004. 
Colleen S. Colton, Chair 
Patricia S. Drawe 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this 
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days 
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals 
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the 
court within 30 days of the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order On Motions For Review in the matter of Johnny 
Albert, Case Nos. 97-0576,99-1213,99-1214J31-1070,01-1071,01-1072,01-1073, and 02-0595, 
was mailed first class postage prepaid t h i s , . ^ day ofAprff, 2004, to the following: 
JOHNNY ALBERT 
2550 WEST 2780 SOUTH #171 
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84119 
AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT 
1575 WEST 2550 SOUTH 
OGDEN UT 84401 
ELLIOT MORRIS, ATTORNEY 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
392 EAST 6400 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107 
FLOYD HOLM, ATTORNEY 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
392 EAST 6400 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107 
QUALITY PLATING 
2087 WEST 2425 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84097 
BARNARD & BURK GROUP INC 
PO BOX 117 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110 
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS. 
AIGCA 
101 CONVENTION CENTER #1100 
LAS VEGAS NV 89109 
AMERITEMPS INC. 
716 EAST 4500 SOUTH 
MURRAY UT 84107 
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HARTFORD INS. 
P O BOX 22815 
DENVER CO 80222 
TRANSWEST CONSTRUCTION 
(address unavailable) 
LORRIE LIMA, ATTORNEY 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND 
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND 
P O BOX 146600 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600 
RICHARD BURKE, ATTORNEY 
648 EAST 100 SOUTH #200 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102 
CARRIE TAYLOR, ATTORNEY 
P O BOX 2465 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110-2465 
THEODORE KANELL, ATTORNEY 
136 E SOUTH TEMPLE #1700 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
>ara Danielson 
Support Specialist 
Utah Labor Commission 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
P.O. BOX 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
Case Nos. 97576,991213,991214,20011070,20011071,20011072,20011073, and 2002595 
JOHNNY ALBERT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT 
and/or WORKERS COMPENSATION 
FUND; QUALITY PLATING and/or 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND; 
BARNARD & BURK GROUP, INC. 
and/or NATIONAL UNION FDtE INS.; 
AMERITEMPS, INC. and/or 
HARTFORD INS.; TRANSWEST 
CONSTRUCTION; UNINSURED 
EMPLOYERS' FUND; EMPLOYERS' 
REINSURANCE FUND, 
Respondents, 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER 
Judge: Richard M. La Jeunesse 
HEARING: Room 334, Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
on December 17,2002 at 08:30 a.m. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order 
and Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Richard M. La Jeunesse, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The petitioner, Johnny Albert, was present and represented by his attorney 
Richard Burke. 
The respondents, Quality Plating and Workers Compensation Fund 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as Quality), were represented by 
attorney Elliott K. Morris. 
The respondents, American Asbestos Abatement and Workers 
Compensation Fund (hereinafter collectively referred to as American 
Asbestos), were represented by attorney Floyd W. Holm. 
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The respondents, Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and National Union Fire 
Ins. (hereinafter collectively referred to as Barnard & Burk) , were 
represented by attorney Carrie Taylor. 
The respondents, Ameritemps, Inc. and Hartford Ins. (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as Ameritemps), were represented by attorney 
Theodore E. Kanell. 
The respondents, Uninsured Employers' Fund and Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund (hereinafter referred to as UEF and ERF respectively), 
were represented by attorney Sherrie Hayashi. 
The respondent, Transwest Construction (hereinafter Transwest), was a 
defunct corporation and did not appear at the hearing. However, the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund defended the issues that involved Transwest 
at the hearing. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
A. Claims against Quality Plating and Workers Compensation Fund in 
Case Nos. 91000124 and 20011070. 
Johnny Albert filed two "Applications For Hearing" with the Utah Labor Commission against 
Quality. Mr. Albert filed his first "Application for Hearing9' against Quality on January 24,1991 
(Case No. 91000124), and claimed entitlement to the payment of medical expenses associated 
with an industrial accident he suffered at Quality on June 18,1990. On July 2, 1991 Judge 
Timothy Allen entered an Order (hereinafter the 1991 Order) that resolved the issues raised in 
Case No. 91000124. 
Mr. Albert filed his second "Application For Hearing" against Quality on October 3,2001 (Case 
No. 20011070), and claimed entitlement to the following workers' compensation benefits: (1) 
medical expenses; (2) temporary total disability compensation, and; (3) permanent partial 
disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits in Case No. 
20011070 arose out of the same industrial accident with Quality that occurred on June 18,1990. 
On May 21, 2002 Mr. Albert filed an "Amended Application for Hearing" in Case No. 20011070 
to include a claim for permanent total disability. Mr. Albert's claims against Quality in Case No. 
20011070 are the claims currently under consideration in the present matter. 
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B. Claims Against American Asbestos Abatement and Workers 
Compensation Fund in Case Nos. 93895,97576,991214, and 
20011072. 
Mr. Albert filed four "Applications For Hearing" with the Utah Labor Commission against 
American Asbestos. Mr. Albert filed his first "Application for Hearing" against American 
Asbestos" on July 15,1993 (Case No. 93895), and claimed entitlement to: (1) medical expenses; 
(2) recommended medical care; (3) temporary total disability compensation, and; (4) permanent 
partial disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits against 
American Asbestos arose out of an industrial accident that occurred on July 28,1991. On 
February 4,1994 Judge Benjamin Sims entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
(hereinafter the 1994 Order) that resolved the issues raised in Case No. 93895. 
Mr. Albert filed his second "Application For Hearing" against American Asbestos on July 15, 
1997 (Case No. 97576), and claimed entitlement to the following workers' compensation 
benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) recommended medical care, and; (3) permanent partial 
disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits in Case No. 
97576 arose out of the same industrial accident with American Asbestos that occurred on July 
28,1991. 
Mr. Albert filed his third "Application For Hearing" against American Asbestos on December 
22,1999 (Case No. 991214), and claimed entitlement to the following workers' compensation 
benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) recommended medical care, and; (3) permanent partial 
disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits in Case No. 
991214 again arose out of the same industrial accident with American Asbestos that occurred on 
July 28, 1991. 
Mr. Albert filed his fourth "Application For Hearing" against American Asbestos on October 3, 
2001 (Case No. 20011072), and claimed entitlement to the following workers' compensation 
benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) temporary total disability compensation, and; (3) permanent 
partial disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits in Case 
No. 20011072 also arose out of the same industrial accident with American Asbestos that 
occurred on July 28,1991. 
On May 21,2002 Mr. Albert filed an "Amended Application for Hearing" in Case Nos. 97576, 
991214, and 20011072 to include a claim for permanent total disability. Mr. Albert's claims 
against American Asbestos in Case Nos. 97576,991214, and 20011072 are the claims currently 
under consideration in the present matter. 
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C. Claims against Ameritemps, Inc. and Hartford Ins. in Case Nos. 
991213 and 20011073. 
Mr. Albert filed two "Applications For Hearing" with the Utah Labor Commission against 
Ameritemps. Mr. Albert filed his first "Application for Hearing" against Ameritemps on 
December 22, 1999 (Case No. 991213), and claimed entitlement to the payment of medical 
expenses together with recommended medical care related to an industrial accident he suffered at 
Ameritemps on June 16,1997. 
Mr. Albert filed his second "Application For Hearing" against Ameritemps on October 3,2001 
(Case No. 20011073), and claimed entitlement to the following workers' compensation benefits: 
(1) medical expenses; (2) temporary total disability compensation, and; (3) permanent partial 
disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits in Case No. 
20011073 arose out of the same industrial accident with Quality that occurred on June 16,1997. 
On May 21, 2002 Mr. Albert filed an "Amended Application for Hearing" in Case Nos. 991213 
and 20011073 to include a claim for permanent total disability. Mr. Albert's claims against 
Ameritemps in Case Nos. 991213 and 20011073 are the claims currently under consideration in 
the present matter. 
D. Claims against Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. National Union Fire Ins. 
in Case No. 20011071. 
Mr. Albert filed one "Application For Hearing" against Barnard & Burk with the Utah Labor 
Commission on October 3,2001 (Case No. 20011071). Mr. Albert claimed entitlement to the 
following workers' compensation benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) temporary total disability 
compensation, and; (3) permanent partial disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for 
workers' compensation benefits in Case No. 20011071 arose out of an industrial accident that 
occurred while employed by Barnard & Burk on January 1,1991. 
On May 21, 2002 Mr. Albert filed an "Amended Application for Hearing" in Case No. 20011071 
to include a claim for permanent total disability. Mr. Albert's claims against Barnard & Burk in 
Case No. 20011071 remained under consideration in the present matter. 
E. Claims against Transwest Construction and Uninsured Employers' 
Fund in Case No. 2002595. 
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Mr. Albert filed one "Application For Hearing" against Transwest with the Utah Labor 
Commission on May 21, 2002 (Case No. 2002595). Mr. Albert claimed entitlement to 
permanent total disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits 
in Case No. 2002595 arose out of an industrial accident that occurred while employed by 
Transwest on November 4, 1982. 
F. Position of the Respondents. 
The respondents conceded that Mr. Albert was permanently and totally disabled. However, each 
of the respondents alleged that an injury other than the one respectively defended by the 
individual respondents directly caused Mr. Albert's permanent total disability. Quality Plating 
also claimed that the industrial accident of June 8,1990 came up short as the legal cause of Mr. 
Albert's back problems. 
G. The Hearing on December 17,2002. 
At the conclusion of the hearing on December 17,2002,1 agreed to leave the evidentiary record 
open 30 days for the receipt of some additional medical records. On January 14,20031 received 
the anticipated medical records and closed the evidentiary record. 
H. ISSUES. 
1. What is the direct cause of Johnny Albert's permanent total disability? 
2. Which of the respondents, if any, owe Johnny Albert permanent total disability 
compensation? 
IH. FINDINGS OF FACT 
A. Employment and Compensation Rates. 
1. Transwest Construction. 
No dispute existed that Transwest employed Mr. Albert on November 4,1982. At the time of 
the November 4,1982 industrial accident at Transwest, Mr. Albert was not married and had no 
dependent children. 
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Mr. Albert listed on his "Application for Hearing" against Transwest a wage rate of $9.00 per 
hour, and a 40 hour per workweek average. At the hearing Mr. Albert testified that he earned 
$8.00 per hour from Transwest, and worked a 40 hour week on average. When confronted with 
the wage rate set forth on the Employers' First Report of Injury in Exhibit "6," Mr. Albert 
conceded he probably earned $4.00 per hour and worked 40 hours per week on average. 
The preponderance of the more credible evidence in this case established that at the time of his 
industrial accident with Transwest on November 4,1982, Mr. Albert earned $4.00 per hour and 
worked 40 hours per week on average. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's appropriate workers' 
compensation rate with Transwest equaled $107.00 per week. [$4.00/hour x 40 hours/week = 
$160.00/week x 2/3 = $107.00/week]. 
2. QuaUty Plating. 
No dispute existed that Quality employed Mr. Albert on June 18,1990. At the time of the June 
18, 1990 industrial accident at Quality, Mr. Albert was not married, but had one dependent child. 
In Case No. 20011070 involving QuaUty, Mr. Albert listed on his "Application for Hearing" a 
wage rate of $5.50 per hour together with a 40 hour per workweek average. At the hearing Mr. 
Albert testified that he earned $9.00 per hour from Quality, and worked a 40 hour week on 
average. Exhibit "7," The Employers' First Report of Injury filed by QuaUty with respect to the 
June 18,1990 industrial accident, listed a wage rate for Mr. Albert of $5.50 per hour. 
The preponderance of the more credible evidence in this case established that at the time of his 
industrial accident with Quality on June 18,1990, Mr. Albert earned $5.50 per hour and worked 
40 hours per week on average. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's appropriate workers' compensation 
rate with Quality equaled $152.00 per week. [$5.50/hour x 40 hours/week = $220.00/week x 2/3 
= $146.66/week + 5.00/week (dependent's allowance) = $152.00/week (rounded to nearest whole 
dollar)]. 
3. Barnard & Burk. 
No dispute existed that Barnard & Burk employed Mr. Albert on January 21,1991. At the time 
of the January 21,1991 industrial accident at Barnard & Burk, Mr. Albert was not married, but 
had one dependent child. 
Mr. Albert's testimony at the hearing on December 17,2002 provided the unrefuted evidence 
concerning his wage rate with Barnard & Burk on January 21, 1991. Mr. Albert earned an 
average weekly wage of $473.20 from Barnard & Burk. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's appropriate 
temporary total disability compensation rate equaled $320.00 per week. [$473.20 x 
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2/3 = 315.46/week + $5.00/week (dependent's allowance) = $320.00 rounded to the nearest 
whole dollar)]. The maximum permanent partial disability compensation rate as of January 21, 
1991 equaled $243.00 per week. The maximum permanent total disability compensation rate as 
of January 21,1991 equaled $309.00 per week. 
4. American Asbestos Abatement 
Judge Sims in his February 4,1994 Order determined the appropriate workers' compensation 
rates for Mr. Albert's July 28,1991 industrial accident with American Asbestos. Judge Sims 
concluded that Mr. Albert's weekly wage rate equaled $510.20 per week as of July 28,1991 
[1994 Order at p. 3], which yielded: (1) a temporary total disabihty compensation rate of $345.00 
per week [id. at p. 5]; (2) a permanent partial disabihty compensation rate of $252.00 per week 
[id. at p. 6], and; (3) a permanent total disability compensation rate of $252.00 per week. I 
adopted the findings and conclusions of the 1984 Order insofar as consistent with the present 
Order. 
5. Ameritemps, Inc. 
No dispute existed that Ameritemps employed Mr. Albert on June 16,1997. At the time of the 
June 16,1997 industrial accident at Ameritemps, Mr. Albert was not married, but had two 
dependent children. 
Mr. Albert provided four different wage rates with respect to his employment at Ameritemps. In 
Case No. 991213 involving Ameritemps, Mr. Albert listed on his "Application for Hearing" a 
wage rate of $9.00 per hour together with a 50 hour per workweek average. In case No. 
20011073 against Ameritemps, Mr. Albert set forth in his "Application for Hearing" a wage rate 
of $8.00 per hour, and a 32 hour per workweek average. In his "Amended Application for 
Hearing" filed in Case No. 20011073 Mr. Albert claimed his appropriate temporary total 
disability compensation rate should equal $292.33 per week consistent with a "Compensation 
Agreement" between Mr. Albert and Ameritemps executed on March 29,1999. At the hearing 
Mr. Albert testified that he earned $9.00 per hour from Ameritemps, and worked a 40 hour week 
on average. 
Ameritemps introduced into evidence Exhibit "2," a payroll history of Mr. Albert with 
Ameritemps from May 17,1997, to June 21,1997. Exhibit "2" set forth precise information 
concerning Mr. Albert's wages in the five weeks leading up to his industrial accident on June 16, 
1997: 
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Pay Day 
May 17,1997 
May 24,1997 
May 31,1997 
June 7,1997 
June 14,1997 
Total 
Weekly Gross Pay 
$399.20 
$262.40 
$370.40 
$400.16 
$290.40 
$1,722.56' 
The best evidence in this case concerning Mr. Albert's average weekly wage with Ameritemps at 
the time of his industrial accident on June 16,1997 came from his actual payroll history 
contained in Exhibit "2." The preponderance of the more credible evidence in this case 
established that Mr. Albert's weekly wage with Ameritemps at the time of his industrial accident 
on June 16,1997 averaged $344.51. [$1,722.56 + 5 weeks = $344.51/week]. Accordingly, Mr. 
Albert's appropriate workers' compensation rate with Ameritemps equaled $240.00 per week. 
[$344.51/week x 2/3 = $229.67/week + 10,00/week (dependents' allowance) = $240.00/week 
(rounded to nearest whole dollar)]. 
B. The Respective Industrial Accidents and Consequent Injuries. 
1. The November 4,1982 Industrial Accident with Transwest 
Construction Case No. 2002595. 
The essential facts of Mr. Albert's November 4,1982 industrial accident at Transwest stood 
undisputed by the parties. On November 4,1982 Mr. Albert worked at Transwest building 
trusses. A stack of the trusses fell over on his low back. Mr. Albert pushed himself out from 
under the trusses. 
Mr. Albert remained off of work with low back pain for one week following the November 4, 
1982 industrial accident at Transwest. Mr. Albert claimed that between 1982, and 1990, he 
sustained no further injuries to his low back. 
11 did not factor in the last check received by Mr. Albert on June 21,1997, because his 
industrial accident occurred on June 16,1997 affecting the number of hours he worked that 
week. 
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a. Injuries Caused by the November 4,1982 Industrial Accident 
at Transwest Construction. 
The parties concurred that no contemporaneous medical records could be located with respect to 
the injuries caused by Mr. Albert's November 4,1982 industrial accident. Of the many medical 
opinions in this case, only Dr. Joel Dall M.D. and Dr. Scott Knorp M.D. addressed Mr. Albert's 
low back problems in connection with the November 4,1982 industrial accident at Transwest. 
On August 15, 2002 Dr. Dall diagnosed Mr. Albert with "Chronic low back pain, 
multifactoral...." [Exhibit "J-l" at 113]. Dr. Dall rated Mr. Albert's low back condition: 
[c]omplaints of low back pain .... [b]ased on his description and my examination 
today, I feel he would best fall into Category 1C (see page 16 in Utah's 2002 
Impairment Guides) which is awarded five percent whole person impairment, [id. 
at 115]. 
Dr. Dall determined that: 
[b]ased on the fact that he lost no time from work I would apportion 0 percent of 
his back injury to the incident at Tram Core2 on 11-18-19823." [id.]. 
On November 25,2002 Dr. Knorp also diagnosed Mr. Albert with "Nonspecific subjective low 
back pain...." [id. at 21]. Dr. Knorp commented concerning a rating for Mr. Albert's low back 
condition: 
Quite frankly, it is my best medical judgment that there is no objective medical 
evidence, and certainly no consistent or reliable historical information to support 
any ratable impairment offered on behalf of Mr. Albert with respect to his spinal 
complaints, [id. at 26] .4 
2
 Actually Transwest. 
3
 As determined supra Mr. Albert's industrial accident at Transwest in fact occurred on 
November 4,1982. 
4
 Dr. Knorp in another portion of his opinion seemed to hedge his bets with a facetious 
3% whole person impairment rating postulated by cynically disregarding all of what Dr. Knorp 
deemed valid objective medical and historical evidence, [id. at 26]. Accordingly, I gave no 
consideration to Dr. Knorp's ironic 3% impairment rating. 
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The preponderance of the more credible evidence in this case supported the opinion rendered by 
Dr. Dall that Mr. Albert suffered from chronic low back pain, which resulted in a 5% whole 
person impairment.5 The medical record in this case contained a consistent chronology of 
treatment for back pain suffered by Mr. Albert over a span of years, [see gen: id. at pp. 147-148, 
150,254-258, 260-300, 302, 310-318]. However, Dr. Dall apportioned none of Mr. Albert's 5% 
permanent partial impairment to his industrial accident of November 4,1982. Therefore, while 
Mr. Albert suffered from chronic back pain that resulted in a 5% whole person impairment, none 
of his rated low back problems derived from the remote November 1982 industrial accident at 
Transwest 
b. Workers' Compensation Benefits Owed by Transwest 
Construction and/or Uninsured Employers' Fund as a Result 
of Johnny Albert's November 4,1982 Industrial Accident 
Mr. Albert's single "Application for Hearing" against Transwest and UEF as represented in Case 
No. 2002595 claimed only permanent total disability compensation. As set forth in Section 
Hl.C.l.a. supra Mr. Albert suffered no permanent impairment from his November 4,1982 
industrial accident with Transwest. Consequently, Mr. Albert's November 4,1982 industrial 
accident could not have caused his permanent total disability. Therefore, Mr. Albert's claim 
against Transwest and UEF for permanent total disability compensation must be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
2. The June 18,1990 Industrial Accident with Quality Plating Case No. 
20011070. 
a. Injuries Caused by the June 18,1990 Industrial Accident at 
Quality Plating. 
No dispute existed concerning the essential facts of Mr. Albert's industrial accident at Quality. 
On June 18,1990 Mr. Albert picked up a stack of metal plates that weighed 30 to 40 pounds, and 
put them on a table. While he lifted the plates Mr. Albert felt his low back pop. Mr. Albert 
remained off work for one week and treated with a chiropractor for his low back problems 
sustained in the June 18,1990 industrial accident. Dr. Dall apportioned half of Mr. Albert's 5% 
whole person impairment from his chronic low back pain to the June 18,1990 incident. 
5
 Utah Administrative Code R. 602-2-2.A.2. requires that a medical controversy over an 
impairment rating over 5% be sent to a medical panel for consideration. In the present matter the 
discrepancy between Dr. Knorp's 0% impairment rating and Dr. DalPs 5% whole person 
impairment rating did not exceed 5%. Therefore no necessity existed for the referral of this issue 
to a medical panel. 
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b. The Issue of Legal Causation as Applied to Johnny Albert's 
June 18,1990 Industrial Accident. 
On June 18,1990 Mr. Albert lifted a stack of steel plates that weighed 30 to 40 pounds and put 
them on a table. Mr. Albert felt his low back pop. Mr. Albert went to Dr. Theodore Conger D.C. 
for treatment of his low back. [id. at 289]. Dr. Conger filed a "Physician's Initial report of Work 
Injury" on June 23,1990. [id.]. 
Quality argued that Mr. Albert could not establish legal causation between his industrial accident 
on June 18,1990, and the low back problems he complained of thereafter. As set forth in 
Section IH.C.l.a. no contemporary records existed that documented the nature of Mr. Albert's 
low back injury on November 4,1982. Further, Dr. Dall apportioned none of Mr. Albert's 
ratable low back impairment to the November 4,1982 industrial accident. Finally, no medical 
records existed that showed Mr. Albert suffered from any ongoing low back problems between 
his accident on November 4, 1982, and the accident of June 18,1990. In short, Quality failed to 
establish that Mr. Albert suffered from preexisting low back problems of the nature and kind he 
sustained on June 18,1990. Therefore, Mr. Albert had no need to jump the higher legal 
causation hurdle enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 
P. 2d 15, 24-25 (Utah 1986). 
c. Temporary Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a 
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident 
Mr. Albert remained off work from Quality six days from June 19,1990, to Jxme 25,1990, when 
Dr. Conger released him back to work. [Exhibit "J-l" at 289]. Consequently, Qaulity and/or 
WCF owed Mr. Albert $65.36 in temporary total disability compensation for the six days, minus 
three, he missed work due to the June 18,1990 industrial accident at Quality.6 [$152.00/week x 
$.43 weeks (three days) = $65.36]. 
d. Permanent Partial Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a 
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident 
6
 Utah Code §34A-2-408, formerly Utah Code §35-1-64, does not allow temporary total 
disability compensation for the first three days of the disability unless the disability lasts more 
than 14 days. 
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Dr. Dall apportioned half of Mr. Albert's 5% whole person impairment due to chronic low back 
pain to the June 18,1990 industrial accident at Quality. [Exhibit "J-l" at 115]. As set forth in 
Section m.C.l.a. the preponderance of the evidence in this case favored the opinion of Dr. Dall 
as to Mr. Albert's low back impairment. Therefore, Quality and/or WCF owed Mr. Albert 
$1,185.60 in permanent partial disability compensation for a 2lA % whole person impairment 
caused by the June 18,1990 industrial accident. [$152.00/week x 312 weeks x 0.025 = 
$1,185.60]. 
e. Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a 
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident 
For the reasons set forth in Section 1E.C.2. infra the injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the June 
18,1990 did not constitute the direct cause of his permanent total disability. Therefore, Quality 
and WCF did not owe Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation. 
3. The January 21,1991 Industrial Accident with Barnard & Burk 
Group, Inc. Case No. 20011071. 
a. Injuries Caused by the January 21,1991 Industrial Accident at 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. 
The essential facts of Mr. Albert's January 21,1991 industrial accident at Barnard & Burk came 
in undisputed. On January 21, 1991 Mr. Albert worked for Bamard & Burk removing asbestos 
at the Chevron Refinery. Mr. Albert slipped, fell, and landed on a pipe with his low back. Mr. 
Albert described his low back as "all messed up" and went to a chiropractor for treatment. On 
January 22,1991 Dr. Conger filed a "Physician's Initial report of Work Injury" with respect to 
Mr. Albert's January 21,1991 industrial accident with Barnard & Burk. [id. at 260]. 
b. Temporary Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins. 
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial 
Accident 
At the hearing, Mr. Albert did not identify any periods of time he missed work due to the January 
21,2001 industrial accident at Barnard & Burk. Accordingly, Barnard & Burk owed Mr. Albert 
no temporary total disability as a result of the January 21,1991 industrial accident. 
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e. Permanent Partial Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins. 
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial 
Accident 
Dr. Dall apportioned half of Mr. Albert's 5% whole person impairment due to chronic low back 
pain to the January 21,1991 industrial accident at Barnard & Burk. [id. at 115]. As set forth in 
Section IH.C.l.a. the preponderance of the evidence in this case favored the opinion of Dr. Dall 
as to Mr. Albert's low back impairment. Therefore, Barnard & Burk and National Union owed 
Mr. Albert $1,895.40 in permanent partial disability compensation consequent to the January 21, 
2001 industrial accident. [$243.00/week x 312 weeks x 0.025 = $1,895.40]. 
d. Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins. 
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial 
Accident 
For the reasons set forth in Section DI.C.2. infra the injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the 
January 21,2001 industrial accident did not constitute the direct cause of his permanent total 
disability. Therefore, Barnard & Burk and National Union did not owe Mr. Albert permanent 
total disability compensation. 
4. The July 28,1991 Industrial Accident with American Asbestos 
Abatement Case Nos. 97576,991214, and 20011072. 
a. Injuries Caused by the July 28,1991 Industrial Accident at 
American Asbestos Abatement 
No dispute existed concerning the facts of Mr. Albert's July 28,1991 industrial accident. On 
July 28, 1991 Mr. Albert worked for American Asbestos at Hill Air Force Base. Mr. Albert fell 
more than twenty feet from a scaffold and landed primarily on his right foot. 
On July 30,1991 Dr. Kenneth Jee M.D. diagnosed Mr. Albert with a: "right comminuted 
calcaneus7 fracture." [id. at 377]. Also on July 30,2001 Dr. Jee operated on Mr. Albert and 
performed a: 
Closed reduction with percutaneous pin manipulation and fixation right 
comminuted calcaneus fracture, [id.]. 
7
 Largest of the tarsal bones that form the heel of the foot. 
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On July 24,1992 Dr. David Howe M.D. concluded that Mr. Albert still suffered from: 
"Traumatic arthritis subtalar joint right foot." [id. at 367]. Also on July 24,1992 Dr. Howe 
performed the second operation on Mr. Albert's right foot a: "Subtalar arthrodesis8 with bone 
graft from right illiac crest." On March 17,1993 Dr. Howe in a third operative procedure on Mr. 
Albert's right foot removed the hardware from the second operation, [id. at 370]. 
Judge Sim's 1994 Order concluded that Mr. Albert's right foot injury caused by his industrial 
accident of July 28,1991 resulted in a "nine percent whole person impairment." [1994 Order at 
p. 4]. As noted in Section LB. supra, I adopted the findings and conclusions contained in the 
1994 Order insofar as consistent with the present Order. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's right foot 
injury caused by his industrial accident of July 28,1991 resulted in a "nine percent whole person 
impairment." 
b. Temporary Total and Permanent Partial Disability 
Compensation Benefits Owed by American Asbestos 
Abatement and/or Workers Compensation Fund as a Result of 
Johnny Albert's July 28,1991 Industrial Accident 
As set forth in Section LB. supra, the 1994 Order resolved the issues concerning temporary total 
and permanent partial disability compensation owed by American Asbestos and WCF to Mr. 
Albert as a result of the July 28,1991 industrial accident. Mr. Albert did not identify any 
additional periods of temporary total disability, nor any additional permanent partial impairment, 
resultant from the July 28,1991 industrial accident. Accordingly, American Asbestos and WCF 
owed Mr. Albert no additional temporary total, nor permanent partial, disability compensation 
for the July 21, 1991 industrial accident beyond that set forth in the 1994 Order. 
e. Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
American Asbestos Abatement and/or Workers Compensation 
Fund as a Result of Johnny Albert's July 28,1991 Industrial 
Accident 
For the reasons set forth in Section IH.C.2. infra the injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the July 
28,2001 industrial accident did not constitute the direct cause of his permanent total disability. 
Therefore, American Asbestos and WCF did not owe Mr. Albert permanent total disability 
compensation. 
Fusion. 
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5. The June 16,1997 Industrial Accident with Ameritemps, Inc. Case 
Nos. 991213 and 20011073. 
a. Injuries Caused by the June 16,1997 Industrial Accident at 
Ameritemps, Inc. 
Again, no dispute existed concerning the factual circumstances of Mr. Albert's June 16,1997 
industrial accident with Ameritemps. On June 16,1997 Mr. Albert worked for Ameritemps at 
Cisco Foods driving a self-propelled pallet jack. Mr. Albert crushed his left great toe between 
the pallet jack and a steel "I" beam. 
On June 30,1997 Dr. Stephen Shultz M.D. took an x-ray of Mr. Albert's left foot and 
discovered: 
Significantly angulated fracture of the first proximal phalanx with probable intra-
articular extension. [Exhibit "J-l" at 322]. 
Also on June 30,1997 Dr. William Burleigh DPM operated on Mr. Albert's left foot, which 
consisted of an: "Open-reduction internal fixation, left hallux.9" [id. at 354-355]. On November 
14,1997 Dr. Burleigh performed a second operation on Mr. Albert's left foot that involved: 
"Arthroplasty hallux left foot." [id. at 342]. 
On March 11,1998 Dr. Howe diagnosed Mr. Albert with; "Traumatic arthritis to proximate 
interphalangeal joint of left great toe." [id. at 368]. Dr. Howe operated on Mr. Albert's left foot 
for the third surgical procedure: "Left great toe proximal interphalangeal joint fusion with bone 
graft from left tibia." [id.]. 
On July 31, 1998 Dr. How determined that Mr. Albert had a: "Failed fusion left great toe 
interphalangeal joint." [id. at 365]. Consequently, Dr. Howe performed the fourth operation on 
Mr. Albert's left foot a repeat: "Fusion of left great toe interphalangeal joint with bone graft from 
left tibia." [id.]. 
On February 25,1999 Dr. Howe gave Mr. Albert an impairment rating for his left foot injuries 
sustained in the June 16,1997 industrial accident, [id. at 148]. Dr. Howe found: 
9
 Great toe. 
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In trying to find a partial impairment for the great toe of Johnny's left foot I have 
had to go to the American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of 
Permanent Impairment. 3rd Edition. The 4th Edition only talks about the MP joint 
of the great toe, it does not talk about the IP joint of the great toe. From table 24 
on page 56, with the IP joint fused at 0 degrees he deserves a 45% impairment of 
the great toe. Table 27, page 59 of this correlates to an 8% impairment of the foot 
which using table 36 page 65 correlates to a 6% lower extremity impairment 
which according to table 46 page 72 correlates to a 2% whole person impairment, 
[id.]. 
On August 15, 2002 Dr. Joel Dall provided an impairment rating for Mr. Albert's left foot 
injuries sustained in the June 16,1997 industrial accident, [id. at 115]. Dr. Dall concluded that: 
In regards to the toe injury, the Fifth Edition refers to Table 17-30 for impairment 
due to ankylosis10 in the toes. His great toe is ankylosed in a position of function 
which provides a four percent whole person impairment, [id.]. 
Because Dr. Dall used the more current and applicable Fifth Edition to the American Medical 
Associations Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, I found his impairment rating 
to be better supported than that given by Dr. Howe based on the Third Edition. Accordingly, the 
preponderance of the better supported medical evidence in this case favored the rating supplied 
by Dr. Dall with respect to Mr. Albert's left foot injuries sustained in the June 16,1997 industrial 
accident. Therefore the preponderance of the evidence in this case established that Mr. Albert's 
industrial accident with Ameritemps on June 16,1997 caused him a 4% whole person 
impairment due to his left foot injury.11 
b. Temporary Total and Permanent Partial Disability 
Compensation Benefits Owed by Ameritemps, Inc. and/or 
Hartford Ins. as a Result of Johnny Albert's June 16,1997 
Industrial Accident 
10
 Bone fusion. 
11
 Ameritemps questioned Mr. Albert concerning a number of incidents where Mr. Albert 
sustained trauma to his left great toe after the June 16,1997 industrial accident. However, no 
medical evidence existed that demonstrated a causal connection between the subsequent 
incidents referred to by Ameritemps and a significant, or ratable, impairment to Mr. Albert's left 
foot other than that caused by his June 16,1997 industrial accident. 
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With the exception of one day at Erickson Construction, Mr. Albert never worked again after the 
June 16, 1997 industrial accident. Ameritemps claimed that it paid Mr. Albert $25,098.00 in 
temporary total disability compensation from June 16,1997, to February of 1999. Mr. Albert did 
not contradict the assertions of Ameritemps with respect to the payment of temporary total 
disability compensation. Neither party addressed the payment of permanent partial disability 
compensation with respect to Mr. Albert's June 16,1997 industrial accident. Because of the 
resolution of the permanent total disability claim herein, I deferred further consideration of the 
issues concerning temporary total disability compensation and permanent partial disability 
compensation. 
C. Permanent Total Disability Compensation. 
L Permanent Total Disability. 
As set forth in Section LF. supra, the respondents conceded that Mr. Albert was permanently and 
totally disabled. However, each of the respondents denied that the respective industrial accident 
associated with that particular respondent caused Mr. Albert's permanent total disability. 
2. The Cause of Johnny Albert's Permanent Total Disability. 
Mr. Albert incurred a 2lA % whole person impairment as a result of the low back injury he 
sustained on June 18,1990 while employed for Quality Plating, [see: Section IH.B.2. supra]. Mr. 
Albert remained off work only one week following his June 18,1990 industrial injury then 
returned to regular employment with Quality Plating, [see: Section HLB.2.a. supra]. 
Mr. Albert also incurred a 2V2 % whole person impairment as a result of the low back injury he 
sustained on January 21,1991 while employed for Barnard & Burk. [see: Section m.B.3. supra]. 
Mr. Albert did not identify any lost time from work as a result of his January 21,1991 industrial 
accident, [see: Section HI.B.3.b. supra]. 
Mr. Albert's industrial accident with American Asbestos on July 28,1991 resulted in a 9% whole 
person impairment as a result of injuries to his right foot caused by the accident, [see: Section 
III.B.4.a. supra]. Because of the injuries cause to Mr. Albert's right foot by his industrial accident 
on July 28,1991, Dr. Jee stated: 
He should be retrained for an occupation that will not involve prolonged walking 
or standing. Furthermore, he cannot climb up ladders, or heights, due to risk of 
falling. An ideal position would either involve a job at a work bench sitting or a 
desk job. Exhibit "J-l" at 233]. 
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On November 30,1993 Dr. Howe described Mr. Albert's "Functional Work Capacity" as result 
of his right foot injuries from the July 28,1991 industrial accident: 
Preclusion from heavy lifting, climbing ladders, working at heights and from 
frequent walking, squatting, kneeling and stair climbing, [id. at 212]. 
Nevertheless, after a lengthy convalescence Mr. Albert sallied forth again into the work force at 
Ameritemps. Mr. Albert's industrial accident with Ameritemps on June 16,1997 resulted in a 
4% whole person impairment as a result of injuries to his left foot caused by the accident, [see: 
Section H[.B.5.a. supra]. Because of the injuries caused to Mr. Albert's left foot by his industrial 
accident on June 16, 1997, Dr. Howe stated: 
Johnny has worked a heavy labor type job. I told him in theory he could return to 
a light duty job, basically a sit-down job. He cannot walk much except to and 
from work, should not be doing any carrying, lifting, etc. [Exhibit "J-l" at 156]. 
Unfortunately, Mr. Albert also suffered from serious psychological problems that caused him 
considerable difficulty in learning new tasks or performing jobs that required any mental acuity. 
After Mr. Albert's industrial accident with American Asbestos on July 28,1991, Barry Richards 
LCSW noted that: 
At this time Johnny's primary (expressed) symptoms are indicative of a normal 
post-traumatic stress response (survival honey moon), with no apparent major 
PTSD symptoms, [id. at 251]. 
On November 30,1993 Dr. Richard Knoeble M.D. diagnosed Mr. Albert with "Severe 
Depression." [id. at 212]. On March 30,1994 Ralf Gant PhD. completed a full scale 
psychological assessment of Mr. Albert that revealed: 
Johnny produced ... a full scale IQ Score of 83 placing him, by DSM ffl-R 
Standards, in the borderline range of intellectual functioning. 
*^ ^^ ^r *^ ^^ n* *l* *l* *|* 
A review of the WAIS-R psychograph indicates severe deficits in long term 
memory, general verbal knowledge, short term memory and attention, general use 
of the language, arithmetic and concentration, impulse control and judgment and 
abstract and logical thinking, [id, at 195], 
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Dr. Gant diagnosed Mr. Albert with: "[rjeactive major depression tu juinniy & woiK-ieiaieu 
injuries and his perceived losses." [id. at 198]. Dr. Gant further noted the causal connection 
between Mr. Albert's industrial injuries and many of his psychological problems when he 
observed that: 
^ s a c o n s e q U e n c e of his reactive depression there is marked restriction in his 
activities of daily living. He experiences marked difficulties in maintaining <=O.»;:J1 
functioning. There are constant deficiencies of concentration. With his 
unresolved physical conditions there is significant deficiency of persistence or 
pace resulting in his inability to complete tasks in a timely manner, particularly in 
a work setting. There has been a continual process of deterioration and 
decompensation since his work injuries, leaving him to withdraw from work His 
adaptive behavior since his injuries has been very poor. [id.]. 
Dr. Gant concluded with cautious optimism that: 
[w]ith assistance from a rehabilitation program, Johnny could utilize his average 
to high average residual skills. With appropriate intervention Johnny might yet be 
restored to his role as a productive worker, [id.]. 
Mr. .Albert attended Vocational Rehabilitation and with all of his physical and psychological 
problems did in fact return to work with Ameritemps until his final industrial accident on June 16, 
1997. However, after Mr. Albert fractured his left great toe on June 16,1997, followed by four 
consequent surgeries, Mr. Albert did not return to work. 
On October 25, 2002 Leslie Coopei I M> p erformed another full sc aleps) etiological assessment 
of Mr. Albert that disclosed: 
Shiply Institute of Living Scale - Weschsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised Full 
Scale IQ of 75 which falls at the 5th percentile and falls at the Borderline Mentally 
Deficient range of intellectual functioning, [id. at 84], 
The Beck Depression Inventory-II... His obtained raw score of 29 suggested 
moderate depression, [id. at 85]. 
On October 22, 2002 Dr. Da\:• .*. ^rehef^n ugnu^ 
psychological problems as: 
on: 
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Axis I - (Clinical Psychiatric Disorders) 
1. Depressive Disorder.... 
2. Learning Disorder, Reading. 
3. Written Communication Disorder, Spelling. 
4. Cognitive Disorder.... [id. at 41]. 
Axis II - (Personality Disorder or Disordered Personality Traits) 
1. Personality Disorder, not otherwise specified, with Paranoid, 
Borderline, and Antisocial Traits. 
2. Borderline Intellectual Functioning 
Axis V - (Global Assessment of Functioning) 
The patient is not able to understand the complexities of his current 
situation and is significantly out of touch with reality. He exhibits anger 
impairment in work, family relations, judgment, and mood .... [id. at 42]. 
Dr. McCann proceeded to give Mr. Albert the only impairment rating for his psychological 
problems, and apportioned the impairment: 
According to the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of 
Permanent Impairment Fifth Edition, he has a Class 2 or mild impairment in 
activities of daily functioning: Class 3 or moderate impairment in social 
functioning: Class 3 or moderate impairment in concentration and Class 4 or 
marked impairment in ability to adapt. Using traditional Utah concepts of 
percentages, his overall estimated psychiatric impairment is Class 3 or probably in 
this case about a 30% whole person impairment. 
Of the patient's 30% impairment 10% is caused by his preexisting borderline 
intellectual functioning, 10% is caused by his disordered personality traits and 
lack of ability to conceptualize reality and about 10% is related to his injuries and 
chronic pain.12 [id. at 43]. 
12
 Dr. McCann did not further apportion the 10% psychological impairment caused by 
Mr. Albert's industrial injuries between those respective injuries. 
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In sum, Mr. Albert sustained a 5% whole person impairment from his back injuries caused half 
and half respectively by the June 8, 1990 industrial accident at Quality, and the January 21,1991 
industrial accident at Barnard & Burk. Mr. Albert incurred a 9% whole person impairment from 
his right foot injuries caused by his July 28,1991 industrial accident at American Asbestos. Mr. 
Albert sustained a 4% whole person impairment from his left foot injuries caused by his June 16, 
1997 industrial accident with Ameritemps. Finally, Mr. Albert had a 30% whole person 
impairment from psychological problems. Of Mr. Albert's psychological impairment, 20% 
preexisted his industrial accidents, and 10% derived undifferentiated from his industrial injuries. 
Mr. Albert's collective physical and psychological problems left him 48% impaired as to the 
whole person. 
Yet at the end of the day, the preponderance of the evidence in this case revealed that despite the 
legion of medical and psychological impairments accumulated by Mr. Albert during the course 
of his life, he remained able to work until the injury he sustained on June 16,1997 with 
Ameritemps. The fractured great toe on June 16,1997, with the subsequent four surgeries and 
4% whole person permanent impairment, proved to be the proverbial straw that broke the 
camel's back. Mr. Albert never returned to work after the June 16,1997 industrial accident, and 
thereafter by consensus remained permanently and totally disabled. Hence, the preponderance of 
the evidence in this case established that Mr. Albert's industrial accident of June 16,1997 acted 
as the direct cause of his permanent total disability. 
3. Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Ameritemps, Inc. and Hartford Ins. as a Result of Johnny Albert's 
June 16,1997 Industrial Accident 
Mr. Albert's industrial accident of June 16,1997 directly caused his permanent total disability, 
[see: Section ni.C.2.supra]. Mr. Albert never worked again after his industrial accident on June 
16, 1997. The preponderance of the evidence in this case confirmed that Mr. Albert became 
permanently and totally disabled on June 16,1997. Therefore, Ameritemps and Hartford owed 
Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation at the rate of $240.00 per week from June 16, 
1997, to June 17,2003. After June 17, 2003, Ameritemps and Hartford owed Mr. Albert on an 
ongoing basis permanent total disability compensation at the rate of $240.00 less 50% of any 
Social Security retirement benefits received by Mr. Albert during the same period. Ameritemps 
and Hartford are additionally entitled to an offset for any amounts of temporary total, or 
permanent partial, disability compensation paid to Mr. Albert for any time period that they also 
owed Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A, Employment and Compensation Rates. 
1. Transwest Construction, 
Transwest employed Mr. Albert on November 4,1982. At the time of the November 4,1982 
industrial accident at Transwest, Mr. Albert was not married and had no dependent children. 
At the time of his industrial accident with Transwest on November 4,1982, Mr. Albert earned 
$4.00 per hour, and worked 40 hours per week on average. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's 
appropriate workers' compensation rate with Transwest equaled $107.00 per week. [$4.00/hour x 
40 hours/week = $160.00/week x 2/3 = $107.00/week]. 
2. Quality Plating. 
Quality employed Mr. Albert on June 18,1990. At the time of the June 18,1990 industrial 
accident at Quality, Mr. Albert was not married, but had one dependent child. 
At the time of his industrial accident with Quality on June 18, 1990, Mr. Albert earned $5.50 per 
hour, and worked 40 hours per week on average. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's appropriate 
workers' compensation rate with Quality equaled $152.00 per week. [$5.50/hour x 40 
hours/week = $220.00/week x 2/3 = $146.66/week + 5.00/week (dependent's allowance) = 
$152.00/week (rounded to nearest whole dollar)]. 
3. Barnard & Burk* 
Barnard & Burk employed Mr. Albert on January 21,1991. At the time of the January 21,1991 
industrial accident at Barnard & Burk, Mr. Albert was not married, but had one dependent child. 
Mr. Albert earned an average weekly wage of $473.20 from Barnard & Burk. Accordingly, Mr. 
Albert's appropriate temporary total disability compensation rate equaled $320.00 per week. 
[$473.20 x 2/3 = 315.46/week + $5.00/week (dependent's allowance) = $320.00 rounded to the 
nearest whole dollar)]. The maximum permanent partial disability compensation rate as of 
January 21,1991 equaled $243.00 per week. The maximum permanent total disability 
compensation rate as of January 21,1991 equaled $309.00 per week. 
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4. American Asbestos Abatement 
Mr. Albert's weekly wage rate with American Asbestos equaled $510.20 per week as of July 28, 
1991, which yielded: (1) a temporary total disability compensation rate of $345.00 per week; (2) 
a permanent partial disability compensation rate of $252.00 per week, and; (3) a permanent total 
disability compensation rate of $252.00 per week. 
5. Ameritemps, Inc. 
Ameritemps employed Mr. Albert on June 16,1997. At the time of the June 16,1997 industrial 
accident at Ameritemps, Mr. Albert was not married, but had two dependent children. 
Mr. Albert's weekly wage with Ameritemps at the time of his industrial accident on June 16, 
1997 averaged $344.51. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's appropriate workers' compensation rate with 
Ameritemps equaled $240.00 per week. [ $344.51/week x 2/3 = $229.67/week + 10.00/week 
(dependents' allowance) = $240.00/week (rounded to nearest whole dollar)]. 
B. The Respective Industrial Accidents and Consequent Injuries* 
1. The November 4,1982 Industrial Accident with Transwest 
Construction Case No. 2002595. 
On November 4,1982 Mr. Albert worked at Transwest building trusses. A stack of the trusses 
fell over on his low back. Mr. Albert remained off of work with low back pain for one week 
following the November 4,1982 industrial accident at Transwest. Between 1982, and 1990, Mr. 
Albert sustained no further injuries to his low back. 
a. Injuries Caused by the November 4,1982 Industrial Accident 
at Transwest Construction. 
Mr. Albert suffered from chronic low back pain, which resulted in a 5% whole person 
impairment While Mr. Albert suffered from chronic back pain that resulted in a 5% whole 
person impairment, none of his rated low back problems derived from the remote November 
1982 industrial accident at Transwest. 
b. Workers' Compensation Benefits Owed by Transwest 
Construction and/or Uninsured Employers' Fund as a Result 
of Johnny Albert's November 4,1982 Industrial Accident 
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Mr. Albert's single "Application for Hearing" against Transwest and UEF as represented in Case 
No. 2002595 claimed only permanent total disability compensation. Mr. Albert suffered no 
permanent impairment from his November 4,1982 industrial accident with Transwest. 
Consequently, Mr. Albert's November 4,1982 industrial accident could not have caused his 
permanent total disability. Therefore, Mr. Albert's claim against Transwest and UEF for 
permanent total disability compensation must be dismissed with prejudice. 
2. The June 18,1990 Industrial Accident with Quality Plating Case No. 
20011070. 
a. Injuries Caused by the June 18,1990 Industrial Accident at 
Quality Plating. 
On June 18,1990 Mr. Albert picked up a stack of metal plates that weighed 30 to 40 pounds, and 
put them on a table. While he lifted the plates Mr. Albert felt his low back pop. Mr. Albert 
remained off work for one week and treated with a chiropractor for his low back problems 
sustained in the June 18,1990 industrial accident. 
b. The Issue of Legal Causation as Applied to Johnny Albert's 
June 18,1990 Industrial Accident 
The Utah Supreme Court held that: 
The language "arising out of or in the course of his employment"... was apparently 
intended to ensure that compensation is only awarded where there is sufficient 
causal connection between the disability and the working conditions. The 
causation requirement makes it necessary to distinguish those injuries which (a) 
coincidentally occur at work because a preexisting condition results in symptoms 
which appear during work hours without any enhancement from the workplace, 
and (b) those injuries which occur because some condition or exertion required by 
the employment increases the risk of injury which the worker normally faces in 
his everyday life. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d 15, 24-25 
(Utah 1986). 
The Court in Allen then adopted an analysis that involved a two part causation test to establish 
both legal causation and medical causation. Id. at 25. With respect to legal causation the Court in 
Allen held that: 
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To meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant with a preexisting condition 
must show that the employment contributed something substantial to increase the 
risk he already faced in everyday life because of his condition. This additional 
element of risk in the workplace is usually supplied by an exertion greater than 
that undertaken in normal everyday life. This extra exertion serves to offset the 
preexisting condition of the employee as a likely cause of the injury, thereby 
eliminating claims for impairments resulting from a personal risk rather than 
exertions at work. 
Thus, where the claimant suffers from a preexisting condition which contributes 
to the injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is required to prove legal 
causation. Where there is no preexisting condition, a usual or ordinary exertion is 
sufficient. Id. at 25-26. 
On June 18,1990 Mr. Albert lifted a stack of steel plates that weighed 30 to 40 pounds and put 
them on a table. Mr. Albert felt his low back pop. Quality argued that Mr. Albert could not 
establish legal causation between his industrial accident on June 18,1990, and the low back 
problems he complained of thereafter. However, Quality failed to establish that Mr. Albert 
suffered from preexisting low back problems of the nature and kind he sustained on June 18, 
1990. Therefore, Mr. Albert had no need to jump the higher legal causation hurdle enunciated by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d at 24-25. 
c. Temporary Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a 
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident 
Mr. Albert remained off work from Quality six days from June 19,1990, to June 25,1990, when 
Dr. Conger released him back to work. Consequently, Qaulity and/or WCF owed Mr. Albert 
$65.36 in temporary total disability compensation for the six days, minus three, he missed work 
due to the June 18,1990 industrial accident at Quality. [$152.00/week x $.43 weeks (three days) 
- $65.36]. 
d. Permanent Partial Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a 
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident. 
The June 18,1990 industrial accident at Quality caused half of Mr. Albert's 5% whole person 
impairment due to chronic low back pain. Therefore, Quality and/or WCF owed Mr. Albert 
$1,185.60 in permanent partial disability compensation consequent to the June 18,1990 
industrial accident. [$152.00/week x 312 weeks x 0.025 = $1,185.60]. 
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e. Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a 
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident 
The injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the June 18,1990 did not constitute the direct cause of 
his permanent total disability. Therefore, Quality and WCF did not owe Mr. Albert permanent 
total disability compensation. 
3. The January 21,1991 Industrial Accident with Barnard & Burk 
Group, Inc. Case No. 20011071. 
a. Injuries Caused by the January 21,1991 Industrial Accident at 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. 
On January 21,1991 Mr. Albert worked for Barnard & Burk removing asbestos at the Chevron 
Refinery. Mr. Albert slipped, fell, and landed on a pipe with his low back. 
b. Temporary Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins. 
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial 
Accident. 
Mr. Albert did not identify any periods of time he missed work due to the January 21,2001 
industrial accident at Barnard & Burk. Accordingly, Barnard & Burk owed Mr. Albert no 
temporary total disability as a result of the January 21,1991 industrial accident. 
c. Permanent Partial Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins. 
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial 
Accident 
The January 21,1991 industrial accident at Barnard & Burk caused half of Mr. Albert's 5% 
whole person impairment due to chronic low back pain. Therefore, Barnard & Burk and 
National Union owed Mr. Albert $1,895.40 in permanent partial disability compensation 
consequent to the January 21,2001 industrial accident. [$243.00/week x 312 weeks x 0.025 = 
$1,895.40]. 
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cL Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins. 
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial 
Accident 
The injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the January 21,2001 industrial accident did not 
constitute the direct cause of his permanent total disability. Therefore, Barnard & Burk and 
National Union did not owe Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation. 
4. The July 28,1991 Industrial Accident with American Asbestos 
Abatement Case Nos. 97576,991214, and 20011072. 
On July 28,1991 Mr. Albert worked for American Asbestos at Hill Air Force Base. Mr. Albert 
fell more than twenty feet from a scaffold and landed primarily on his right foot. Mr. Albert 
suffered a: "right comminuted calcaneus fracture." Mr. Albert underwent three surgeries on his 
right foot consequent to his July 28,1991 industrial accident. Mr. Albert's right foot injury 
caused by his industrial accident of July 28,1991 resulted in a 9% whole person impairment. 
b. Temporary Total and Permanent Partial Disability 
Compensation Benefits Owed by American Asbestos 
Abatement and/or Workers Compensation Fund as a Result of 
Johnny Albert's July 28,1991 Industrial Accident 
The 1994 Order resolved the issues concerning temporary total and permanent partial disability 
compensation owed by American Asbestos and WCF to Mr. Albert as a result of the July 28, 
1991 industrial accident. Mr. Albert did not identify any additional periods of temporary total 
disability, nor any additional permanent partial impairment, resultant from the July 28,1991 
industrial accident. Accordingly, American Asbestos and WCF owed Mr. Albert no additional 
temporary total, nor permanent partial, disability compensation for the July 21,1991 industrial 
accident beyond that set forth in the 1994 Order. 
c. Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
American Asbestos Abatement and/or Workers Compensation 
Fund as a Result of Johnny Albert's July 28,1991 Industrial 
Accident 
The injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the July 28,2001 industrial accident did not constitute 
the direct cause of his permanent total disability. Therefore, American Asbestos and WCF did 
not owe Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation. 
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5. The June 16,1997 Industrial Accident with Ameritemps, Inc. Case 
Nos. 991213 and 20011073. 
a. Injuries Caused by the June 16,1997 Industrial Accident at 
Ameritemps, Inc. 
On June 16,1997 Mr. Albert worked for Ameritemps at Cisco Foods driving a self-propelled 
pallet jack. Mr. Albert crushed his left great toe between the pallet jack and a steel "I" beam. 
Mr. Albert suffered an angulated fracture of the first proximal phalanx as a result of the June 16, 
1997 industrial accident. Mr. Albert underwent four surgeries with respect to the left great toe 
fracture sustained in June 16,1997 industrial accident. Mr. Albert's industrial accident with 
Ameritemps on June 16,1997 caused him a 4% whole person impairment due to his left foot 
injury. 
b. Temporary Total and Permanent Partial Disability 
Compensation Benefits Owed by Ameritemps, Inc. and/or 
Hartford Ins, as a Result of Johnny Albert's June 16,1997 
Industrial Accident 
Because of the resolution of the permanent total disability claim herein, I deferred further 
consideration of the issues concerning temporary total disability compensation and permanent 
partial disability compensation. 
C. Permanent Total Disability Compensation. 
1. Permanent Total Disability. 
Mr. Albert is permanently and totally disabled. 
2. The Cause of Johnny Albert's Permanent Total Disability. 
Mr. Albert sustained a 2Vi % whole person impairment as a result of a low back injury he 
sustained on June 18,1990 while employed for Quality Plating. Mr. Albert remained off work 
only one week following his June 18,1990 industrial injury then returned to regular employment 
with Quality Plating. 
Mr. Albert also sustained a 2Vi % whole person impairment as a result of a low back injury he 
sustained on January 21,1991 while employed for Barnard & Burk. Mr. Albert did not identify 
any lost time at work as a result of his January 21,1991 industrial accident. 
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Mr. Albert's industrial accident with American Asbestos on July 28,1991 resulted in a 9% whole 
person impairment as a result of injuries to his right foot caused by the accident. Mr. Albert also 
suffered from serious psychological problems that caused him considerable difficulty in learning 
new tasks or performing jobs that required any mental acuity. Mr. Albert's psychological 
problems left him with 30% whole person impairment. Of Mr. Albert's psychological 
impairment, 20% preexisted his industrial accidents, and 10% derived undifferentiated from his 
industrial injuries. Mr. Albert's collective physical and psychological problems left him 48% 
impaired as to the whole person. 
Mr. Albert with all of his physical and psychological problems did in fact return to work with 
Ameritemps until his final industrial accident on Junel6,1997. However, after Mr. Albert 
fractured his left great toe on June 16,1997 followed by four consequent surgeries, Mr. Albert 
did not return to work. Mr. Albert's industrial accident with Ameritemps on June 16,1997 
resulted in a 4% whole person impairment as a result of injuries to his left foot caused by the 
accident. 
The Utah Supreme Court specifically held that in permanent total disability cases it is the duty of 
the Labor Commission to determine the ultimate issue of disabiUty. Hardman v. Salt Lake City 
Fleet Management, 725 P. 2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1986). Professor Larson stated that: 
Apart from apportionment statutes, the employer is generally held liable for the 
entire disability resulting from a combination of the prior disability and the 
present injury. ARTHUR LARSON and LEX LARSON, LARSONS WORKERS* COMPENSATION 
LAW § 90.01 (2002). 
Neither applicable Utah Code Amend § 35-1-67 (1995), nor its successors, nor its predecessors 
that deal with permanent total disabiUty, contain any provisions for apportionment of liability. 
Utah Code Amend § 35-l-67(l)(b) (1995) provides in relevant part that: 
To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee 
has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence that: 
(ii) the industrial accident... was the direct cause of the employee's 
permanent total disability. 
00523 
Albert v. American Asbestos Abatement et al 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
page 30 
The Utah Court of Appeals held that: 
Under the 'odd lot' doctrine, the Commission may find permanent total disability 
when a relatively small percentage of impairment caused by an industrial accident 
is combined with other factors to render the claimant unable to obtain suitable 
employment. Hoskins v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 918 P. 2d 150,154 (Utah 
App. 1996) (citing: Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Management, 725 P. 2d 
1323,1326 (Utah 1986). 
The case of Smith v. Mity Lite presented facts similar to the present case. Smith v. Mity Lite, 939 
P. 2d 684 (Utah App. 1997). In Smith the claimant suffered from nonindustrial depression, 
somatoform pain disorder, opiate dependency, personality disorder and depression, id. at 689. 
The Utah Court of Appeals held that the Labor Commission ought to have found permanent total 
disability where the claimant proved by a preponderance of the evidence the: "[industrial 
accident caused a portion of Smith's physical impairment; that he cannot perform his former job; 
that he is currently disabled." id. at 690. 
In the present case, despite the legion of medical and psychological impairments accumulated by 
Mr. Albert during the course of his life, he remained able to work until the injury he sustained on 
June 16,1997 with Ameritemps. The fractured great toe on June 16,1997, with the subsequent 
four surgeries and 4% whole person permanent impairment, proved to be the proverbial straw 
that broke the camel's back. Mr. Albert never returned to work after the June 16,1997 industrial 
accident, and thereafter remained permanently and totally disabled. Hence, Mr. Albert's 
industrial accident of June 16,1997directly caused his permanent total disability.13 
3, Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Ameritemps, Inc. and Hartford Ins. as a Result of Johnny Albert's 
June 16,1997 Industrial Accident 
13
 Some of the respondents argued that Social Security Administration's determination of 
Mr. Albert's permanent total disability based on his psychological impairments should be 
determinative concerning the cause of his permanent total disability for workers' compensation 
benefits. Of course Social Security's determinations are not binding on the Labor Commission. 
Otherwise, the Labor Commission in every like case would simply await and adopt the decision 
of the Social Security Administration as to permanent total disability and the cause thereof. 
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Mr. Albert's industrial accident of June 16, 1997 directly caused his permanent total disability. 
Mr. Albert never worked again after his industrial accident on June 16,1997. Mr. Albert became 
permanently and totally disabled on June 16,1997. Therefore, Ameritemps and Hartford owed 
Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation at the rate of $240.00 per week from June 16, 
1997, to June 17, 2003. After June 17,2003 Ameritemps and Hartford owed Mr. Albert 
permanent total disability compensation at the rate of $240.00 less 50% of any Social Security 
retirement benefits received by Mr. Albert during the same period. Ameritemps and Hartford are 
entitled to an offset for any amounts of temporary total, or permanent partial, disability 
compensation paid to Mr. Albert for any time period that they also owed Mr. Albert permanent 
total disability compensation. 
V. ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that all of Johnny Albert's claims against the respondent, 
Transwest Construction, in Claim No. 2002595 are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all of Johnny Albert's claims against the respondents 
Uninsured Employer's Fund and Employers' Reinsurance Fund in Case Nos. 97576, 
991213,991214,20011070,20011071,20011072,20011073, and 2002595 are hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in Case No. 20011070, Quality Plating and/or Workers5 
Compensation Fund of Utah shall pay Johnny Albert temporary total disability 
compensation from June 18,1990, to June 25,1990, at the rate of $152.00 per week for 0.43 
weeks, for a total of $65.36. That amount is accrued, due and payable in a lump sum, plus 
interest at eight percent (8%) per annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in Case No. 20011070, Quality Plating and/or Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah shall pay Johnny Albert permanent partial disability 
compensation for a two and one half percent (2Vi %) impairment rating at the rate of $152.00 
per week for a total of $1,185.60. That amount is accrued, due and payable in a lump sum, plus 
interest at eight percent (8%) per annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Johnny Albert's claims for permanent total disability 
compensation against Quality Plating and Workers' Compensation Fund in Case No. 
20011070 are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Quality Plating and/or Workers Compensation Fund 
shall with respect to Case No. 20011070 pay all medical expenses reasonably related to Johnny 
Albert's industrial accident of June 18,1990, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Johnny Alberts claim against Barnard & Burk and/or 
National Union Fire Ins. for temporary total disability compensation in Case No. 20011071 
is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in Case No. 20011071 respondents, Barnard & Burk 
and/or National Union Fire Ins., shall pay Johnny Albert permanent partial disability 
compensation for a two and one half percent (2Vi %) impairment rating at the rate of $243.00 
per week for a total of $1,895.40. That amount is accrued, due and payable in a lump sum, plus 
interest at eight percent (8%) per annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Johnny Albert's claims against Barnard & Burk and 
National Union Fire Ins. in Case No* 20011071 for permanent total disability compensation 
are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents, Barnard & Burk and/or National Union 
Fire Ins., shall with respect to Case No. 20011071 pay all medical expenses reasonably related 
to Johnny Albert's industrial accident of January 21,1991, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per 
annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Johnny Albert's claims against American Asbestos 
Abatement and/or Workers Compensation Fund in Case Nos. 97576,991214, and 20011072 
for additional temporary total disability compensation, permanent partial disability 
compensation, and permanent total disability compensation are hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents, American Asbestos Abatement and/or 
Workers Compensation Fund shall with respect to Case Nos. 97576,991214, and 20011072 
pay all medical expenses reasonably related to Johnny Albert's industrial accident of July 28, 
1991, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Ins, in Case Nos. 
991213 and 20011073 shall pay Johnny Albert permanent total disability compensation at the 
rate of $240.00 per week from the date of permanent total disability on June 16,1997, until June 
16,2003 in the total amount of $74,880.00, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum for 
each payment as it came due, less any compensation already paid by respondents Ameritemps, 
Inc. or Hartford Ins. After June 16,2003, respondents, Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Ins., 
shall continue to pay Johnny Albert permanent total disability compensation at the rate of 
$240.00 per week less fifty percent (50%) of any Social Security retirement benefits received by 
Johnny Albert for the same period. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents, Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Ins., shall 
with respect to Case Nos. 991213 and 20011073 pay all medical expenses reasonably related to 
Johnny Albert's industrial accident of June 16,1997, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per 
annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents, Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Ins., shall 
pay statutory attorneys' fees of $10,352.00 directly to Richard Burke. That amount shall be 
deducted from Johnny Albert's award and sent directly to Richard Burke's office. 
Dated this 22nd day of July 2003, 
ard M. La Jeunesse 
strative Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion For Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their Responses to the Motion for Review 
within 20 days of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct 
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
Response. If none of the parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board, the review 
will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner. 
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